Russia's Autumn Offensive - Pokrovsk, the Coming Winter and a Changing Battlefield

As another summer and autumn campaign season comes to a close in Ukraine, Ukraine's leadership are very clear that the country is under immense pressure.

These last months have definitely brought pain points for Moscow. Russia's

ground offensives failed to generate any strategic scale breakthroughs and fell far short of their generally assessed objectives. Their near irreplaceable

objectives. Their near irreplaceable strategic bomber assets took a bloody nose on home turf, while Ukraine's ability to strike targets deep in the Russian rear and, shall we say, place upward pressure on insurance premiums for targets in the Russian energy sector

only increased. Coupled with the effect

only increased. Coupled with the effect of new non-kinetic sanctions imposed by various countries, including the United States, the growing burden on the overt taxed Russian war economy has been plainly apparent. But in other respects,

plainly apparent. But in other respects, Ukraine is perhaps under more pressure than it has been at any time since 2022.

The coming winter is expected to be a difficult and cold one. The Kremlin has more or less stuck to its maximalist demands, with most making their way into the recent so-called 28point plan. But

as all that pressure, diplomacy, and economic warfare has played out, hard fighting at the front has continued with Russia launching offensive effort after offensive effort. And so today, roughly

offensive effort. And so today, roughly a quarter after our last update, we're going to review the results of Russia's offensive actions over the last 3 months, looking at how just some of the battles around places like Pakovska played out, what that might tell us

about the status of the two forces, the tactics they've been employing, and what that might mean for both sides as temperatures on the Ukrainian battlefield start to drop yet again. To

do that, we'll start with a bit of background, going through Russia and Ukraine's potential objectives over the last several months of fighting, how the military aspects of those objectives interact with other issues like diplomacy and economics, and then going

through a couple of areas of the front that are interesting, but which we don't have time for a detailed look at today.

Then we'll zoom in on a couple battles that represent major efforts for either or both sides. Mostly that'll be a focus on the Pakovsk area. We'll cover a couple of other fronts like Zaparisia and Crimea as well. Before we jump into

it though, let me welcome back a returning sponsor. Unfortunately, it's

returning sponsor. Unfortunately, it's just not possible for every major global event to get its own 1-hour PowerPoint.

Sometimes news headlines might have to do, but different organizations might often choose to elevate different information or angles to the headline, meaning if you want to get a slightly fuller view, you're going to want to see more than one. For example, this

headline reports an explosion in Russia's Black Sea port city of Novorisk. This one gives us a potential

Novorisk. This one gives us a potential cause, a Ukrainian strike, and flags an impact on oil shipments. Well, this one introduces a potential so what factor, a jump in the oil price. The tool being

used here to quickly flip between headlines is long-term channel sponsor ground news. A combination website and

ground news. A combination website and app that doesn't just draw on thousands of news sources around the world. It

also potentially provides context. I'm a

big fan, for example, of often having ownership information right there. It

also allows you to do things like hone your coverage in on particular topics that interest you, as well as potentially draw on tools like the blind spot feed. What that can potentially

spot feed. What that can potentially allow you to do is gain a bit of awareness of what's being reported by sources you might not ordinarily consume, which whether they're good sources or not, might give you greater awareness of what others might be seeing

and reading. For me at least, that's

and reading. For me at least, that's often a point of curiosity, and it's one of the reasons why I've been using Ground News for years at this point. So,

if you're interested, there will be a link in the description that will give you access to a 40% discount on a Ground News Vantage plan, which is one I use, and which gives you access to a full range of features. And so, with my thanks to Ground News for being this

channel's longest running sponsors, let's get back to it. Okay. So, on the understanding that military campaigns are usually fought for for reasons, even if they're very bad reasons, I think it's important to put Russia's summer

and autumn 2025 offensives into the context of what they say they're trying to achieve. Because, as much as Russia

to achieve. Because, as much as Russia might deploy different and sometimes contradictory narratives to justify what they're doing, there are some elements of the Russian demand list that have been relatively consistent. Among other

things, there are territorial demands, and Ukraine has to disarm and swear off foreign alliances. That was true early

foreign alliances. That was true early this month when Pascov said that Russia was willing to seek a quick end to the Ukrainian conflict, but only after achieving its stated goals. It was

reportedly true in the recent discussions between Steve Witkov and Kir Ditriv. And it was true way back in 2022

Ditriv. And it was true way back in 2022 when reportedly some of the deal breakers in negotiations were Russian demands that Ukraine seriously reduce its military and accept security guarantees that were effectively subject

to a Russian veto. And while the exact extent of Russia's immediate territorial ambitions appears to have waxed or waned, we've seen some Russian political figures, for example, discuss the possibility of going after hard or

Adessa, as well as the currently claimed regions. The demands around disarmament

regions. The demands around disarmament and security guarantees, or lack thereof, are in and of themselves arguably a dealbreaker from Ukraine's perspective. Because if they were to

perspective. Because if they were to give up things like their long-range weapons, their military capacity, and their relationship with the NATO states, their ability to deter a future Russian invasion would be seriously diminished,

leaving them with no guarantee other than Moscow's pinky promise that this wouldn't happen again and under circumstances much more favorable for Russia, because the Russian military would be given time and scope to Brianna

while Ukraine would be prevented from doing so. That might go some way towards

doing so. That might go some way towards explaining then why in order to achieve those objectives, Russia has continually leaned on military means. From Moscow's

perspective, there are arguably at least two interrelated win conditions here.

Either they directly achieve their political goals by military means, so destroying the Ukrainian military and seizing the territory they claim, and then accepting war termination around that new status quo. or they inflict so

much pressure on Ukraine and its allies, for example, by trying to break down Ukraine's energy sector and its military capabilities that they're able to force Ukrainian capitulation even in the face of these maximalist demands. At the same

time, Moscow might see a need to achieve one of those wing conditions without hitting any of its potential failure points. If you're cutting away at

points. If you're cutting away at Ukrainian military potential, but in the process dulling the Russian military blade so much that you'd be better off hitting people with a handle, then the Ukrainians might not see a reason to

capitulate no matter how hard their own situation is. Likewise, if a military

situation is. Likewise, if a military victory is possible, but not before critical economic and political issues mount at home, then from Moscow's perspective, that's not good enough. The

Russians have a lot of time and economic endurance to work with, but not an infinite amount of time. The reason why I bring all this up in a Battlefield Update episode, even though we've gone through some of this before, is because it helps explain why Russian forces are

always going to have an offensive impetus. I've sometimes seen pro

impetus. I've sometimes seen pro Ukrainian commentators suggest that Russia is essentially stupid for launching continuous costly attacks on a battlefield where the defender is so heavily advantaged. But while I think it

heavily advantaged. But while I think it might be fair to sometimes criticize occasionally evil convalins inspired offensive tactics by the Russian military, they want to take ground and they want to wear down the Ukrainian

military. And to do that, they need to

military. And to do that, they need to attack. Ukraine, by contrast, appears to

attack. Ukraine, by contrast, appears to have changed its strategic objectives significantly over the course of the war. Initially, the goal was simply

war. Initially, the goal was simply survival. Then, when the special

survival. Then, when the special military operation started to fall apart, it became reclaiming all of Ukraine's territory by force if necessary. Then, arguably starting when

necessary. Then, arguably starting when the mid2023 offensive failed to achieve its objectives, we started to see those goals dialed back. And currently the public Ukrainian position is to try and force the Russians to accept a ceasefire

along the current battle line at which point negotiations can begin. That

broadly aligns with the position adopted by many of the countries publicly supporting Ukraine. And it places

supporting Ukraine. And it places different imperatives on the Ukrainian military to achieve those objectives. If

you go back to basics, you'd expect the Ukrainian military to direct their effort towards three elements at the same time. Denial, so preventing the

same time. Denial, so preventing the Russian military from achieving its objectives, including its territorial goals in the near term. attrition. So,

breaking down Russian military capacity to reduce the odds that they conclude they can take their goals in the future.

And finally, punishment. Going after the Russian rear areas, strategic targets to drive up the cost of the war continuing.

Basically, what you want from keys perspective is for Moscow to be achieving less, expecting to achieve less, and for what they do achieve to be costing more and more, perhaps with the hope being that eventually you get to a

point where what Moscow expects to achieve isn't worth the price that it expects to pay in order to achieve it. A

lot of that punishment element has to do with things like sanctions and the long-range missile and drone campaign which have been significantly ramping up and which we've covered elsewhere. But

they don't exist in a vacuum. And in

order to give the maximum effect, the dynamics at the front matter, which is why today we're dealing mostly with that denial aspect. And in the future, we're

denial aspect. And in the future, we're going to want to have a closer look at the attrition part. Essentially asking

the extent to which the Russians and Ukrainians are achieving their battlefield objectives and what kind of price they're paying to do so.

It's important to understand that battlefield events and the decisions behind them don't take place in a vacuum. You remember I said that both

vacuum. You remember I said that both Russia and Ukraine have attrition related potential win conditions here.

For Russia causing Ukraine to capitulate or its military capacity to collapse and for Ukraine, the Russian military losing the ability to consistently advance while driving up the cost at home. In

both cases, foreign actors have an enormous influence over the ability of either side to do that. As we've seen from the Russian perspective, it's not practically possible to economically exhaust a country as long as it receives

sufficient support from the EU and the US. On the flip side, without any

US. On the flip side, without any support, the Ukrainian war economy just couldn't hold together. It's also

relevant when it comes to the pressure aspect. Sanctions can hurt the Russian

aspect. Sanctions can hurt the Russian economy. Providing Ukraine long-range

economy. Providing Ukraine long-range weapons and the intelligence to use them could hurt the Russian economy, and the amount of pain Russia receives on the battlefield is closely correlated to how much military assistance Ukraine receives. So for both sides, the

receives. So for both sides, the battlefield isn't just important because of the direct military effect the fighting has on its opponent. It's also

important because it can shape the perceptions and actions of those foreign powers. You could argue, for example,

powers. You could argue, for example, that by continually remaining on the offensive, even when it's very costly to do so relative to the amount of territory taken, Russia can continuously generate headlines like this one and

therefore play on global perceptions that Russia has the military advantage and that its victory is inevitable. That

can then serve as a kind of basis, if you like, for bold Russian demands. One

reported element of the recent 28-point plan, for example, is that Ukraine give up to Russia the rest of Donetsk Lohansk. That includes not just open

Lohansk. That includes not just open fields and the homes to many Ukrainians, but also the towns and cities of the so-called fortress belt, places like Slavansks, heavily fortified positions with a

combined pre-war population far larger than the likes of Bakmoot, Aivka, or Pukovsk. If the patterns for most of

Pukovsk. If the patterns for most of this war so far held, taking those objectives would be an incredibly long and bloody process for the Russian military, if they could do it at all.

They'd first have to get past smaller barriers like Severk that have held since 2022, and then contend with a much larger and more difficult defensive barrier after that. Given that Moscow probably isn't keen on the idea of

paying the economic cost necessary to carry on this war long enough to actually take those objectives the hard way, there might be a huge incentive on Moscow to, if at all possible, get other actors to pressure Ukraine into giving

up these fortress cities without a fight. Continually putting forward

fight. Continually putting forward proposals that would hand over that territory or impose other conditions on Ukraine that they would find difficult to accept might also represent a kind of win-win from the Russian perspective. In

the best case scenario, those terms are accepted and they get for basically free something they've been unable to achieve through almost four years of war so far.

And even in the worst case, Moscow can spin this as them at least attempting to negotiate, suggesting it's actually Ukraine torpedoing the peace process by de facto refusing to surrender and thus potentially causing splits within NATO

or reducing calls for new sanctions against Moscow. There's plenty of signs

against Moscow. There's plenty of signs that Moscow understands that and is willing to twist the diplomatic process to gain an advantage. Putin, for

example, has reportedly said that Ukraine is being unrealistic if it fails to agree to recent US proposals while blaming Europe and Ukraine for the absence of peace. When Putin blames Ukraine and its European allies for

being under the quote illusion and dream of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, end quote, he's implicitly splitting Ukraine and most of the NATO allies off from the United States.

Similarly, according to reports, the 28-point plan includes a provision that has hundred billion dollars of Russian assets frozen in Europe going to fund the reconstruction of Ukraine with the United States keeping half the profits.

That particular provision hasn't been 100% confirmed, of course, but it is arguably an example of the kind of thing you as Moscow might try to include in a proposal if your goal was to try and make it more attractive for Washington

while keeping it as a bit of a non-starter for the other participants.

That might make sense if your goal isn't necessarily actually a peace agreement, but instead to find any fish you can in the NATO alliance structure and then hammer a multi-billion dollar chisel as far as it'll possibly go. It just

doesn't cost Moscow much to have someone like Dimmitri head over to Miami for a couple of days, restate their demands to Witco, and then basically see what happens. But none of that political,

happens. But none of that political, diplomatic, and information warfare aspect works without at least some military element. Reduced assistance in

military element. Reduced assistance in backing for Ukraine only really matters if the military pressure is maintained.

And Russia might believe that reduced assistance and support can only be achieved by applying military pressure.

Russia has burned an enormous amount of military and economic resources to get to a point where they control less of Ukraine than they did during parts of 2022. But nonetheless, in a strategic

2022. But nonetheless, in a strategic sense, that appears to be where we are with Russia continually trying to grind its way forward in the hope that eventually that achieves the intended effect. Which gets us to the front and

effect. Which gets us to the front and the way things have been playing out over the last couple of months. Warning

up front though, when you're talking about a front line that's as insanely long as the one in Ukraine is, it's never going to be the case for it being a single front with one story. The

Hassan front, for example, is relatively static and very sparsely manned by both sides compared to some other places along the front. In large part, that's because you have a river barrier serving as the deacto dividing line between the

two sides. And as a result, you might

two sides. And as a result, you might see the frequent exchange of long-range fires, drone attacks, and raids, but not very much in terms of larger scale offensive action. It's kind of hard to

offensive action. It's kind of hard to pull off a tank or motorcycle rush across a muddy riverbed. Although, it'll

be interesting to see as more of these areas start to dry up and firm up after destruction of the Kokovka dam back in June 2023, whether or not we see more changes to the dynamics of this area in

2026. Then you have areas that might

2026. Then you have areas that might still see relatively small troop concentrations but comparatively more movement. As you can see circled on the

movement. As you can see circled on the right there. This year Russia made a

right there. This year Russia made a couple of moves into Ukraine's nearv region. This is not a stated priority

region. This is not a stated priority sector either for Russia or Ukraine.

Most of the terrain is relatively open.

And in those conditions we've seen the Russians sometimes able to take ground.

Almost all those gains you can see circled on the right, for example, have occurred since the start of September.

Another example would be the situation further to the south in Zaparisia. We'll

get to that a bit later on. At the other end of the spectrum, you have areas that again don't have top strategic billing for either side, but where Russia has essentially hit a wall. You remember

back in 2024, for example, Russia launched an offensive in the Hard region. Putin declared they would create

region. Putin declared they would create a buffer zone and push up towards the city of Hard. But in the roughly 1 and 1/2 years since then, Russia has barely left the starting gate. What you can see on the right there is the rough mapping

of the situation there as of 15 November 2024 and 15 November 2025. Not exactly a blitzcreed to deliver a Belgarod buffer zone. The Bachmood sector is another

zone. The Bachmood sector is another example of that dynamic. Bachmood itself

remember fell in May 2023 and in the time since hints, the Russians have managed to crawl just past the next barrier long chass. I think that's a testament to just how hard forward the

defense in this area has often been, but also potentially reason enough for some to reflect on past decision-making.

You'll remember that especially towards the tail end of the Bachmood campaign, there were some voices on both sides arguing that the fight over the area was absolutely critical and that on the Ukrainian side for example, Ukraine had

to keep pouring more resources into defending Bakmoot even as the situation became more and more tactically unfavorable because if it was allowed to fall, obviously defense in this sector would inevitably collapse. By contrast,

I'd argue that what a lot of the examples in this war would suggest, whether that be Bakmoot or Rafka, is that when you have a major defensive barrier fall, you will likely see the other side gain some offensive momentum

and take some additional territory, but it's usually quite difficult for the force on the offensive to maintain the momentum, and it's usually possible for the defender to stabilize their defensive lines further back. The fact

the Russians were eventually able to take Marmoot after a hard fight didn't prevent them then having to fight another hard battle in order to take Chaos which I think adds more evidence to the argument that in hindsight Ukraine likely should have withdrawn

from the fight in Bakmoot somewhat earlier than it did. While the details of the fighting across various fronts differ, however, I do think we now have a pretty good understanding of what a standard quote unquote Russian offensive

effort looks like in 2025. On the right there, I've thrown up some maps of the area that includes Kopansk 1st June and mid November, respectively, to illustrate this concept at a slightly more zoomed out level. Whereas earlier

in the war, you might have seen Russia attempting big operational scale mechanized breakthrough and exploitation efforts with big lines on map that cut deep into Ukrainian territory, that's long proved basically unworkable both in

the face of Russian losses and also Ukrainian defensive tactics. In

particular, Ukraine has effectively combined defensive barriers and obstacles like landmines and fortifications, very decentralized and very responsive artillery fire, and an absolute [ __ ] ton of drones, which give

a very high level of situational awareness and a lot of lethality.

Meaning on Ukrainian battlefields, mass has sometimes gone from kicking ass to being ass. The Russian adaptation at the

being ass. The Russian adaptation at the tactical level then has been to increasingly turn to infiltration tactics where you might have individual or very small groups of troops try and advance often on foot or on motorbikes

on the understanding that a lot of them aren't going to make it. But some of them will filter through the very thin Ukrainian lines, dig in and conceal themselves before potentially being reinforced by the survivors of other infiltration attempts and eventually

building up the numbers to actually go on the offensive. with a core part of why that works being that individual or small groups of infantry can be a lot harder to detect than a column of bloody tanks rolling down the only road in the

area. At a more operational level, it's

area. At a more operational level, it's to use those tactics that enable the Russian forces to steadily nibble their way forward to slowly work not so much through Ukrainian defenses, but around them. The general Russian approach

them. The general Russian approach appears to be to try and create these bulges in the line surrounding Ukrainian sectors, preferably on at least three sides, and then using other assets like drones, lottery munitions, and

long-range fires to place pressure on the supply lines that remain. When you

hear various sources talking about operational encirclements in Ukraine, this is often the concept they're discussing. not a physical encirclement

discussing. not a physical encirclement where you have a ring of Russian troops around the Ukrainian defensive positions, but one where the Russians are wrapped around on most sides and then try to close off the remainder using artillery and drones. In an ideal

world, what that can potentially allow the Russians to do, albeit very slowly, is make it very painful and difficult for the Ukrainians to hold the positions that remain in that pocket, eventually forcing them to either withdraw or a

trick away. In part because you're often

trick away. In part because you're often going to be limited by how fast BS can move stealthily on foot. This is seldom the kind of approach that can deliver rapid territorial gains and it's going to be expensive especially on the

infantry forces. You probably struggle

infantry forces. You probably struggle in a lot of western militaries for example to get doctrine adopted that called for infantry to advance on foot in groups of ones or twos while adopting an approach to casualties that would

have made Lord Farquad proud. But we've

seen the Russians adopt this approach at multiple points along the front including in some of the areas the Ukrainians have defended most heavily.

Which gets us to the focus of a lot of this recent news the battle for Picrosk.

While picking the exact start date for the battle is always going to be somewhat subjective, what's clearer is that this has been a long fight. Pakovsk

gained some of its relevance as one of the next major defensive barriers in Russia's way after Adivka fell in February 2024. And many chronologies

February 2024. And many chronologies will mark the start of the fight for Pakovsk itself as July that year. The

first six months then and stop me if you've heard this story before were mostly consolidation and incremental advances by the Russians moving past Abdiva towards Pakovsk and starting the long process of trying to essentially

reach around the elomeration. On the top right there, you can see the approximate situation on January 1st this year, where the southern part of the grasp has started to form around Picrosoft, which I've thrown an orange circle around, and then the situation on July 1st on the

bottom right, which illustrated that Russian effort to the northeast of Pakovsk really hadn't had the same success pushing west that the others in the south had. When we last talked about Pakovsk back in August, I believe the

situation had started to become more critical. The situation shown on the

critical. The situation shown on the bottom right there is as of 1st August.

And as you can see, the assessment at the time was that those two additional months of fighting had allowed Russia to grind forward to the north of the settlement, getting Povsk closer and closer to a point where it would be

enclosed on three sides rather than generously too. When we did that update,

generously too. When we did that update, we flagged the risk to the ground lines of communication supporting and sustaining Povsk and the most reasonable assessment at the time was that the settlement would eventually be taken by

the Russians. The key question was time.

the Russians. The key question was time.

Both in terms of how long it would take the Russians to further stretch their positions around the settlement, problematizing holding it, and when or if the Ukrainians would decide to pull out. As at time of recording in mid-

out. As at time of recording in mid- November, this is how Deep State Map sees the situation. And while exact territory delineations will differ depending on what map you're looking at, the key point here is if you look not

just that red, but also at that gray zone, you both have an assessed Russian presence across most of Purovsk itself and a very narrow pathway for the potential resupply or evacuation of Ukrainians who remain in the area. A lot

of the recent fighting then has been over this remaining supply corridor with the Russians trying to tighten their operational encirclement and potentially turn it into a full encirclement while the Ukrainians have tried to hold the

door open, so to speak. often in the form of localized counterattacks against some of these more extended Russian forces. Some of those efforts have

forces. Some of those efforts have worked, some have not, but they do highlight the degree of priority both sides appear to be giving this particular front. We saw, for example,

particular front. We saw, for example, special forces belonging to Ukraine's military intelligence forces used in a helicopter landing operation against the southern arm of the Russian choke. And

based on what we've seen publicly released by both sides about this kind of operation, I think it allows us to make a couple of observations. one that

Ukraine was willing to risk these kind of elite assets to try and change the situation on the ground here. No one,

including the Ukrainians, have an infinite supply of special forces troops. There are a lot of missions that

troops. There are a lot of missions that those troops would be suitable for. So,

if you're going to commit them to essentially an elite infantry role here, there's a significant risk and opportunity cost associated with that.

Meanwhile, if we look what the Russians have publicly released about how they responded to those operations, it highlights some of their strengths and weaknesses at a local level. On one

hand, Blackhawk helicopters were able to come right up to the front in order to land troops, even if the Ukrainians were taking a significant risk. That probably

doesn't make for a moment the Russian air defense units are going to take particular pride in. Although, part of the driver here might be the wider phenomenon of groundbased air defense systems being pushed further back from the line because they, like just about

everything else out there, are vulnerable to drones and indirect fires.

And so, most commanders probably aren't going to risk pushing their valuable GBA assets right up to the front line. On

the other hand, as you'd expect, Russian drone forces at a local level appear to be very lethal. We repeatedly seen small drones used as a response, not just against this operation, but other Ukrainian efforts as well. And in this

case, the casualties those drones appear to inflicted against troops that in qualitative terms Ukraine might find difficult to replace. On one hand, Ukrainian drones can make it very difficult for Russia to advance. But on

the other side, Russian drones can make it difficult for Ukraine to take back territory once Russia is dug in. To

attack, you need to expose yourself. And

in Ukraine, exposing yourself is often a lethal exercise.

The drone threat coupled with limited infantry numbers means that often positions, especially in Pocaros itself, have been somewhat fluid and difficult to assess. You've had situations where

to assess. You've had situations where Russian troops might pop up in an area normally thought to be controlled by the Ukrainians, potentially raise a flag or try and ambush drone teams, for example.

While in other cases, as you can see on the left there, the Ukrainians might push a team into what was thought to be Russian controlled territory or at the very least a gray zone, raise a flag, which might raise questions about who

controls a particular position, but very rarely definitively answer them. Troops

in basement and buildings can be mixed in among one another, and the lines, such as they exist, appear to often be reasonably porous. There's also a couple

reasonably porous. There's also a couple of dynamics about how the Russians appear to be operating the sector that I think are worth flagging. And to help do that, we have a very rare event on this channel. I'm actually going to show a

channel. I'm actually going to show a short video clip. It's one you may have seen going around showing Russian troops on the move in the PROV sector. So,

while it was a relatively short one, I think there's a couple of things that stand out there. The first is that it demonstrates that while the main Russian operational effort here might be to try and close the pences around these Ukrainian defensive positions, that doesn't mean the Russians aren't

continually pushing more troops into, for example, Pukovsk itself. Videos like

this are often geoloccated, showing Russian troops trying to move into that urban area, with the video also giving us some clues as to how that movement might be possible. and what kind of force is making it in terms of the what

I think a generous way to describe this would be as a relatively light motorized infantry force with the less generous characterization being that this is yet more Mad Max [ __ ] being used by

ostensibly a major military power to fight a war in 2025. You're seeing a lot of motorbikes and converted civilian vehicles. Removing the doors appears to

vehicles. Removing the doors appears to be a relatively frequent practice, presumably so the crew can bail out faster in an emergency or if they see an incoming drone, and relatively few military vehicles that might be able to

provide any degree of protection or fire support. While these vehicles clearly

support. While these vehicles clearly can work, and because they're so cheap and accessible, they can be used in a semi or fully disposable manner where they might be used essentially as one-way delivery systems for troops, getting them where they need to be

before being essentially abandoned. In

most cases, I'd argue there are military systems available that would enable you to do that kind of troop delivery mission while expecting fewer casualties in the process. To me, that suggests that some Russian forces might be making

the conscious decision to preserve valuable equipment, even if it means further casualties. It's important to

further casualties. It's important to stress this isn't the only kind of Russian force composition we're seeing.

We've also seen armored mechanized offensives attempted, for example, usually with relatively limited results.

But I still think it's a useful illustration of what force quality issues can sometimes look like in Ukraine. After all, it's kind of hard to

Ukraine. After all, it's kind of hard to imagine a top tier military with plenty of funding ever voluntarily choosing to throw away protected military spec systems in order to have its troops drive around essentially in converted

pickup trucks that provide absolutely zero protection against incoming fragmentation. Isn't it? But there is a

fragmentation. Isn't it? But there is a point to be made here that if it's ugly but it works, it can still be a significant problem for the other side.

Which leads us to two indications about the how here. The first, as you can see, is this movement is taking place against the backdrop of abysmal weather. That is

very thick fog coverage. Bad weather and diminished visibility can have a major impact on drone operations, making fog cover and bad weather like this an opportunity to move troops. Even then

though, you can still see evidence the threat is very much front of mind. You

would have seen a Russian drone in the image, as well as someone carrying a shotgun, presumably for CU duties. These

kind of movements are clearly possible on occasion, but they're never going to be risk-free. And we have other videos

be risk-free. And we have other videos being released of what happens when either side attempts movements like this in much better weather when opposing drones are able to fly more freely. And

suffice to say, YouTube would probably be less thrilled if I shared you video demonstrating the common results there.

Movement inside the drone kill zone in Ukraine is clearly possible, but outside of very specific conditions, it tends to be a very dangerous and often very costly affair. In any case, though,

costly affair. In any case, though, based on the information we have available in the open source, I think it's fair to describe the current situation in Pakovsk as fairly dire. In

fact, in some ways, I'd argue it's relatively surprising the fight is still going on at all. For some time, Russian troops, sometimes under the cover of bad weather, have clearly been able to infiltrate into Prosk. What you can see

on screen here, for example, is a map showing geol locations of Russian troops in the Prosk area put up on Twitter by Clement Malin, with the orange dots being the most recent ones. Note that in this kind of war, seeing Russian or Ukrainian troops in an area doesn't

necessarily mean they hold that area, and you can have positions from both sides intermingled. But it's clear

sides intermingled. But it's clear Russian troops have been able to get into Pakovsk. And I've seen at least one

into Pakovsk. And I've seen at least one video that appears to show a Ukrainian drone strike against a small Russian dismounted element north of Pakovsk.

Those Russian troops obviously don't appear to be in any state to actually take ground after that infantry drone interaction, but them being cited there at all might raise the prospect of there being more where that came from. And so,

absent a Russian decision to reduce the pressure on the sector, I'd argue the most likely outcomes in the near term would be either a Ukrainian withdrawal or eventually a collapse in the defensive efforts with Russia

successfully closing the pocket. Some of

the less conservative mappers out there who make less use of gray zones emphasize the extent to which logistics in the pocket are already fairly mounted. A lot of resupply is being done

mounted. A lot of resupply is being done by drone and the number of actual Ukrainian troops present is significantly down from what it once was. The significant decision for

was. The significant decision for Ukraine then as in so many of these situations is how many of those troops to pull out and when. Because as we've seen in past engagements like Bakmoot, depending on the context, holding on to

a fortified defensive position can be both a mechanism for Ukraine to inflict highly asymmetric casualties against the Russians or a way for Russia to grind down Ukrainian military strength. At the

start, fighting to defend a strong defensive position like Bakmutz or Vular can bring massive advantages to the defender. The attacker has to slowly

defender. The attacker has to slowly work their way either through those defenses or around them, exposing themselves as they do so and taking significant casualties in the process.

There were parts of the battle for Bakmood, for example, where casualties were massively in Ukraine's favor. But

it is possible, and we've seen it get to the stage where the defensive situation degraded so much that the advantage can start to slip away from the defending troops. If you're surrounded on three

troops. If you're surrounded on three sides and have to worry about fighting in three directions while also being concerned about infiltrating Russian troops, for example, sure, you can pull out the chesty puller quotes, but your

combat efficiency is likely to diminish.

If you're losing drone operators to Russian infiltrators because they're able to filter through your lines, or your ground lines of communication are under such threat that you lose troops in the rotation and resupply process to

enemy fires and drone attack, then the concern is that it's possible for stubbornly holding on a defensive position to move from being a sensible battle in an ongoing war of attrition to one that potentially works against you

by wearing down your force faster than it needs to be. It's possible we see the Ukrainians continue to try to dedicate resources to holding that supply corridor open to try and hold on to Pokovsk and Mirror at least in some way.

But an alternative that some analysts have expected for some time is that instead those attacks will be used to widen the corridor as much as possible so that eventually an evacuation operation can be attempted. The

challenge of course is that retreating while in contact is one of the most difficult military maneuvers that any force can attempt. And in the Ukrainian context, where the lines of retreat are covered by drones and Russian fires,

even more so. But given the extent the Russians have already so compromised Bakroska's defensive position, I think there's an argument to suggest that despite the risks, a withdrawal may have to be attempted and potentially should

have been some time ago, which then presumably raises the next question. If

it's likely that Picarovsk and the surrounding area will be fully taken by the Russians sooner or later, to what extent does that matter strategically, operationally, and tactically? Often it

can feel like as we're watching a conventional battle play out, there's a parallel narrative campaign occurring as well with the goal often being to try and shape how a particular military event is seen in terms of being either a

defeat or a victory at two extremes. In

terms of somewhere like Pakovsk or Abdivka, for example, you might have more pro-Russian voices saying this represents a collapse the Ukrainian forces and will represent an end to their resistance, a major strategic

defeat at minimum. While a more dismissive Ukrainian voice might discount the value of losing positions like Bakmoot, Avdka or Burovsk and instead focus mainly or just on the value of the attrition Russia took in

the process. The point I'd suggest that

the process. The point I'd suggest that both sides potentially risk missing is that the value of a particular position to either side can change over time. One

critique I'll sometimes see, for example, is voices from one side complaining the other side admitted that a position was important a year ago and is now trying to pretend it isn't important. You've seen pro-Russian

important. You've seen pro-Russian voices use that narrative at places like Bakovsk or Bakmoot. While if you go back to 2022, 2023, it was sometimes the Ukrainians mocking the Russians for

claiming places like Kasan were vital and forever Russian or that Leman was logistically vital, only for those places to be somewhat discounted once the Ukrainians took them back. While

yes, there's often some goalpost shifting going on, the marginal value of taking a position like Pakovsk is going to change based on the context. If you

look at Pukros for the Ukrainians back in January 2024, for example, it was a critical logistics hub. At this point, fighting is still going on around places like Kazorovka. And in that context, as you

Kazorovka. And in that context, as you can see from the map, Pakovsk has a natural logistics role to play. In that

situation, suddenly losing it or having it destroyed would be massively detrimental to Ukraine's actions elsewhere. By comparison, the marginal

elsewhere. By comparison, the marginal cost of defending it is relatively low because it's incidental to defending all those other frontline locations anyway.

So, at this point, it's an operationally valuable location. Cut forward to

valuable location. Cut forward to November 2024. The Russians have started

November 2024. The Russians have started to advance slowly to the west of Abdivka. And now Pakovsk has a different

Abdivka. And now Pakovsk has a different value. It still potentially has some

value. It still potentially has some logistic significance, but a lot of those positions that it was supporting have now been taken by the Russians. And

the Ukrainians have no interest in logistically supplying them with anything other than high explosive. And

in that respect, drones and artillery are usually preferred as delivery options anyway. Now though, you could

options anyway. Now though, you could argue Prosk has significant military value as a defensive position. It's a

reasonably sized urban elomeration and we've seen how difficult it is for Russia to take those over the course of this war and at this point it has a relatively open supply route to the west which makes sustaining that position

relatively less costly. Prosovk at this point is going to be very valuable to the Ukrainians at least in this area and also to the Russians because if they were to be able to take it they would undermine some of those defenses elsewhere, rob the Ukrainians of its

remaining logistics function and also remove a defensive barrier to further advances. In the current situation

advances. In the current situation though, Ukraine can't really derive any of that same value. Area has become a logistics black hole, not a logistics hub, and that among other factors makes it problematic in terms of value as a

defensive position. A potential

defensive position. A potential remaining point of value would be denial, not allowing the Russians to use this position. But even then, the

this position. But even then, the military value of Pakovsk to the Russians, we'll leave aside the question of politics, propaganda, and public perception for a moment, also in many ways comes down to what would happen

next. There are some elements of what

next. There are some elements of what Russia could potentially gain that we can be relatively confident about. If

they were able to secure Pros, for example, it might provide decent shelter for Russian drone operators. They could

potentially come forward, turn basement and buildings into base positions, and in so doing move some of their control and launch sites further forward, which might risk Ukrainian vehicles and positions further back. It would also

remove a stubborn defensive obstacle to further advances. Although, to be clear,

further advances. Although, to be clear, there are Ukrainian defenses beyond this. And then in terms of the logistics

this. And then in terms of the logistics value of the location, that would likely change depending on how close the front lines remain to the area. If the lines are still comparatively close and you continue to have swarms of Ukrainian

drones hovering over Pacross the way you currently do, then just as per the Ukrainian experience, it's going to be more difficult to use the logistics hub than a position that's further back and less vulnerable to attack. The core

point here is twofold. That if you're trying to assess the value of taking Brosk, it depends both where you set your baseline and what you assume will happen next. The second point is the

happen next. The second point is the very fact that a place like Bros could be a defensive barrier being fought over in November 2025 arguably demonstrate just how incremental this war is and how

much expectations have changed since 2022 and 2023.

Some of you, for example, might remember this image, I believe from May or June 2022. The joke represented by the blue

2022. The joke represented by the blue arrows was that Russia appeared to be continually downscaling its military ambitions from picking off an entire chunk of the country in March 2022 to

potentially get into Bakmoot by June 2022. And the bit marked by the red

2022. And the bit marked by the red square there is Prosk, a position being fought over and potentially on track to fall towards the end of 2025. And in

some ways, the pacing is even slower than that M might suggest because, as you can see on this one, some of the areas being fought over now, like Kyansk, were actually under Russian control when this map was made in mid

2022. When we are talking about faster

2022. When we are talking about faster or slower advances in 2025, I think it's important to acknowledge just how World War I the baseline has become. Something

that might be described as a localized collapse of the front in 2025 might not have merited a news report in 2022.

Perhaps nothing illustrates that change more than stories like this one, which was run in Russian state media, which literally ran the following headline.

Russian troops liberate bakery plant in Kyansk in Harov region. According to the report, Russian assault teams have advanced considerably along Jazinski streets over the past 24 hours. With the

highlight of the report being a claim that assault teams had taken seven buildings and a factory structure that the Ukrainian army had previously been using. We are apparently at the point

using. We are apparently at the point where state media will run stories about taking individual buildings. This is

arguably not that far removed from the heroic defense of Burger Town making its way into the national American media and I think illustrates fairly well the crushing dynamics of the territorial aspect of this fight for both sides. For

the Ukrainians, despite their best efforts and the enormous costs, they have not yet succeeded in stabilizing the front line. While for the Russians, while they've been able to maintain offensive initiative and some degree of

momentum, the rate of territorial advance remains in strategic terms abysmally slow. It's just not reasonable

abysmally slow. It's just not reasonable to expect that the Russian military would conquer even their stated territorial objectives in Ukraine, the Nets, Lahansk, Zaparisia, and Hassan if it takes the better part of 2 years to

go from the fall of Adivka to the fall of Bakovsk or from the conquest of Bakmoot to moving past Chivyar. But hey,

obviously Sloppy and Krak would be a walk in the park. The major risk then we've seen play out for both sides at various point in this conflict then is that something occurs to at least temporarily change that balance,

destabilize the front line, and potentially set the stage for the other side to make more rapid gains. We saw

that happened to the Russians back in 2022. Their lines had become very thin.

2022. Their lines had become very thin.

Ukrainian force mobilization efforts had proceeded much faster than their own.

And one of the results in that dynamic was arguably the hark of counteroffensive which required among other things a Russian mobilization of 300,000 additional troops in order to stabilize in the here and now. The risk

might be that by focusing on areas like Brosk, the Ukrainians leave themselves too thin in other sectors such as they are. The majority of Russia's recent

are. The majority of Russia's recent territorial gains haven't happened around priority sectors like Bakovskyansk.

They've occurred down on this point of the front in Ukraine's Zaparisia region with the maps on the right there showing you the change in the situation between the 1st of September and 17 November. If

you're a Ukrainian defending some of the critical positions on the Zaparisia front, that kind of Russian advance is deeply unwelcome because while it may not look like much at a strategic scale, it still endangers Ukrainian defensive

positions and gets the Russian military closer to the key city of Zaparisia. And

so the key potential dynamics here, I'd argue, are much as they've always been, overextension and exhaustion. How

rapidly are battles like Pakovsk chewing up Russian offensive capacity versus exhausting the Ukrainian defenders? And

whether that might potentially set conditions for the current status quo, which is these slow grinding advances to give way either to a period of more rapid operational scale breakthroughs or potentially if the balance of attrition

goes in the other direction, the pace of advance tailing off even further. In

that respect, I'd argue that territorial control is often a secondary and lagging indicator, with the more important element being the status of the two forces and the way they're fighting.

There are some elements of that question I'm going to want to unpack in future episodes. Casualties, desertions,

episodes. Casualties, desertions, equipment storage levels are all things that are on the agenda before the end of the year. But I'd also suggest the

the year. But I'd also suggest the fighting around Pakovsk and a number of other places around the front might allow us to make some other tentative observations about these two forces.

Both in terms of areas where their capability levels are relatively high and potentially improving and also places where one force the other might be struggling. To start with the

be struggling. To start with the Russians, for example, one area where they've proven to be quite capable and very dangerous is the use of UAS and launitions to achieve operational effects, specifically in interdiction role. What we've often seen the

role. What we've often seen the Russians, or at least part of the Russian force, try and do at places like Picrosk, is instead of focusing their drones just against frontline targets, instead direct them towards the supply

lines. You try and go after the trucks,

lines. You try and go after the trucks, the cars, the motorbikes, everything coming along those ground lines of communication. You try and make it as

communication. You try and make it as difficult as possible for the Ukrainians to resupply, to rotate, to reinforce, and if necessary to retreat. And if you look at that approach in the context of what Russia has often tried to do with

some of these tougher urban elomerations, which is get around them rather than bash straight through them.

What that kind of use of UAS load munitions, oneway attack drones, and fires can potentially allow them to do is go after the supply corridor into a potential salient that the ground troops

themselves can't get to. If the Russian army can encircle a position on three out of four sides, then potentially drones and fires can do the rest with the remaining one. And in the case of some Russian drone operators like

Rubicon or those trained by them, you might also see them focus a lot of attention and resources on trying to break down one of the key elements of the Ukrainian defense, the drone force, going after not just the drones

themselves, but also transmitters and where possible operators. The idea there appearing to be that if you could push the Ukrainian drone operators further back, you might degrade their ability to provide an unmanned greeting party to

small groups of Russian infantry trying to move into or beyond the gray zone.

Some observers have noted that this phenomenon is part of what makes specialized Russian formations like Rubicons so dangerous. Not just because they themselves are very adept at these kind of tactics, but also because they

can teach those approaches to other Russian units. And I think it's notable

Russian units. And I think it's notable that we have some evidence that where Ukraine has been able to locate Rubicon operators where they're in Ukraine rather than in Moscow, for example.

We've seen evidence of them sometimes being deemed targets worthy of relatively high value and in demand munitions. Think glide bombs, high mar

munitions. Think glide bombs, high mar strikes, etc. These tactics obviously can't be 100% effective when it comes to choking off supplies. You'd still expect to see a trickle coming in by drone, for example. But I'd suggest this approach

example. But I'd suggest this approach was a significant part of what eventually enabled the Russians to push the Ukrainians back the way they did in the Kursk region and is also a noteworthy part of the story around

Prosovk. Key parts of that puzzle are

Prosovk. Key parts of that puzzle are not just the tactics, but also the technical and resource factors. Doctrine

without resources is just theory crafting, and intention without equipment is just daydreaming. I can say I want to go to the moon next week, but without a bloody spaceship, I'm not likely to get there. And so in order to try and execute on these deeper

interdiction style operations, the Russians have rolled out a number of tools. What you're seeing on the right

tools. What you're seeing on the right there, for example, is a system we saw shot down back in August, which is basically a Russian allart reconnaissance drone that's been converted into a kind of airborne drone

aircraft carrier. The long endurance

aircraft carrier. The long endurance fixed wing drone flies over the target area, releases the parasite quadrotors, and then those can presumably go about attacking targets in the relevant area.

In other cases, the setup might not include a fixedwing drone like this, but instead a larger rotor drone functioning as a repeater, a carrier, or both. What

you can see on the right there is a Ukrainian take on that concept. A larger

Queen Hornet drone on the top right being used as a carrier for a smaller FPV, and on the bottom as a carrier for a repeater. In both cases, you're

a repeater. In both cases, you're contributing to that core goal of trying to get that weaponized FPV into the target area and then trying to ensure you maintain enough signal for long enough that you get the explosive it's

carrying where you want it to be.

Another Russian approach has been to instead of taking drones with FPV style features and then figuring out ways to make them fly further, instead taking drones that can already fly a long way and giving them FPV style features.

We've seen Russia, for example, take the weaponized Dorito style systems, the Gerberas and Shahed type stuff, and come up with versions that are intended to go after dynamic battlefield targets, like

a supply truck, for example. One way to do that has been to take a shahed style system that would normally navigate with a combination of GNS and INS and instead add a camera system and facility for

direct manual control. So, an operator can take control of it the way they normally would a much smaller drone and pilot it into a relevant target. The

Ukrainians have reported on the destruction and use of these systems this year, but we did get a bit of advanced notice from the Russians. The

image on the right there, for example, shows essentially what we're talking about, a one-way attack drone with a claimed range of 2,000 km, but now you have a sensor package up front that might facilitate this kind of tactical

deployment. My assessment would be that

deployment. My assessment would be that from a technical and tactical perspective, the Russians have gotten better at using their drones and munitions against Ukrainian supply lines. And I suggest one reason the

lines. And I suggest one reason the situation didn't get even worse from a Ukrainian perspective is that Russian adaptation has proceeded in parallel with the Ukrainian counter adaptation.

The Ukrainians have been rolling out interceptor drones and the units to operate them in larger and larger numbers and those are one of the primary countermeasures to these sort of longer range drone attacks. Fixed wing ISR drones and lingering munitions in

particular are one of the preferred target types for a lot of interceptors.

And so I think it's fair to suggest that if these things weren't showing up essentially at the same time, Ukrainian supply lines in several places might be under even more pressure. On the flip side though, there are some elements

where the Russian force combination is still clearly struggling. Between the

ability to slowly move forward on the ground around a resistant objective, largely using things like infantry infiltration tactics, and the ability to use drones and fires to try and choke off remaining supply routes, Russia has

come up with a combination that all else being equal, you'd expect to deliver results eventually. What it doesn't

results eventually. What it doesn't really have is an ability to deliver results quickly or cheaply. Outside of

really bad weather that they can't really take credit for, there's no way to comprehensively suppress defending Ukrainian drone operators, for example.

And without doing that, concentrating and moving is going to be difficult. And

the effectiveness of both Russia's fire and maneuver assets are undermined by various factors. According to some

various factors. According to some Russian commentators, for example, the effectiveness of their fires are often undermined by an implacable and persistent Russian foe, [ __ ] reporting. The fact that false reporting

reporting. The fact that false reporting is still a massive issue in the Russian force is always going to be difficult to prove, but there are a couple of points of evidence pointing in that direction.

When we saw video of Russian military leaders briefing on the war, for example, they showed maps like this one.

Those were widely criticized, including by Russian commentators, or arguably especially by Russian commentators, for overexaggerating the degree of Russian territorial control. Garasimov and by

territorial control. Garasimov and by extension Putin were depicting areas under Russian control where we can still in the open source see Ukrainian assets and not see Russian assets. So the

question becomes do they know that and is this all deliberate exaggeration for propaganda purposes or is the picture being fed up to the Kremlin actually significantly divorced from the battlefield reality? There are also

battlefield reality? There are also frequent anecdotal claims and reports on both sides about the extent to which [ __ ] tends to flow upstream. But the

interesting aspect for me comes when you map where Russian fires are being directed, especially the heavier stuff like glide bombs against suspected or known Ukrainian positions. A lot of them tend to get absolutely pounded.

Ukrainian intelligence is talking about Russia producing 120,000 glide bombs this year, for example. But other

Ukrainian positions sometimes seem to miss out on that Russian high explosive treatment which may align giant asterisk for the low confidence here with some of the complaints I've seen on the Russian side that positions will occasionally be

falsely claimed to be under Russian not Ukrainian control. And because everyone

Ukrainian control. And because everyone has to go along with that, it can be hard to give permission to bomb or shell them. What you're seeing on the right

them. What you're seeing on the right there, for example, is a post by the official Russian Ministry of Defense account claiming that quote, "As a result of active and decisive actions, units of the Neper group of forces

liberated Malia Tmachka." End quote.

That's a town in the Zaparisia region, which is an interesting claim to make given that we've continued to see geoloccated footage, appearing to show Russians becoming casualties in the process of trying to take it. It's

generally assessed that at the time that post was made, Russia hadn't taken Malia Toka. At time of recording, they still

Toka. At time of recording, they still haven't taken it. But the risk of stuff like this, beyond the potential propaganda embarrassment, if you then later claim to have taken the same town again and again and again repeatedly, is

that if someone in the command structure is insisting that it's already been done, it might put the troops actually trying to make that daydream a reality at a significant disadvantage. Sure,

friendly fire might be an inherent part of large-s scale combat operations, especially in the Russian military, but someone in the VKS might raise an eyebrow if you're continually asking them to waste valuable ordinance, bombing yourself. This is obviously only

bombing yourself. This is obviously only one part of the broader story of Russian military performance in Ukraine, and the Ukrainians very much have their own issues with false reporting as well. But

on a list of factors that are holding the Russian military back, besides the Ukrainians, obviously, I do think it deserves a mention. Another factor to highlight is the continued qualitative shift of more Russian units from the

heavily mechanized formations we remember from 2022 and 2023 to what we might generously call light motorized or draon style forces in late 2025. Take

the Furiosa patent assault car on the right there as a salient example. Just

exactly how much quality actually military equipment the Russians still have in inventory is a question I want to unpack more in the future. We're

pretty confident, for example, that after almost four years of war, Russian heavy equipment storage levels are looking pretty dire. One recent estimate I'll link in the description, for example, suggested that before the

invasion, Russia had maybe 7,200 tanks in storage. And as at the most recent

in storage. And as at the most recent count, perhaps 80% of the potentially viable vehicles are gone, and only 115 remain in decent condition. That doesn't

mean all of those missing vehicles have been destroyed, but they might not always be making it to the front, either. Russia has other borders to

either. Russia has other borders to worry about and would probably like to maintain some kind of strategic reserve.

And so we have seen the Russian military divert some new and restored hardware to units that don't appear to be fighting in Ukraine itself, forcing some of the Russian have not units of the front to lean more and more into the resources

they can access. That includes more ancient military equipment like this very old school 9M33 missile and a Russian air defense system, more converted civilian vehicles, and of course, more infantry. There's a couple

of data points that back up that assertion that we're continuing to see some parts of the Russian military essentially devolve. If we look at what

essentially devolve. If we look at what we have evidence for Russian personnel losses appear to be holding or increasing, but the ratio between visually confirmed Russian and Ukrainian heavy equipment losses have in many cases been narrowing. As you can see on

screen here, for example, through much of 2024, the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian tanks lost was usually between 3 and 4:1. Across 2025 so far, it's been closer to 1 1/2 to just over 2:1.

Critically, that's not because Russia appears to have found a way to suddenly start destroying more Ukrainian vehicles. As you can see, over the last

vehicles. As you can see, over the last two years, Ukrainian tank losses in any given month have tended to be relatively stable. There's variance, of course.

stable. There's variance, of course.

Losses in quarter 3 of this year were significantly lower than they were in quarter 1, but that in turn represented a bit of a high point compared to most of 2024. What's changing isn't the

of 2024. What's changing isn't the number of Ukrainian tank losses. It's

the falloff in Russian ones, which suggests either the Russians have found a much better way to protect their armor against Ukrainian drone attack, or there's just less Russian armor being exposed for the Ukrainians to attack in the first place. While we can't be

certain given the patterns we're seeing play out across multiple heavy equipment categories, I tend to lean towards option B being at least part of the explanation here. We can also look at

explanation here. We can also look at some data that's released by the Ukrainian USF, the unmanned systems force. It's important to understand the

force. It's important to understand the USF doesn't control all Ukrainian drone operators. Far from it, but it does

operators. Far from it, but it does include some of the more famous units.

And very helpfully for us from an analytics perspective, compared to some of the other Ukrainian drone units like Basar Group that don't publish almost anything, the USF literally publishes monthly performance dashboards.

Essentially a monthly business reporting dashboard if your metrics were less lead generation revenue and more total quantity of Russian military equipment explosively disassembled. As I've said

explosively disassembled. As I've said repeatedly in the past, I think you need to be very, very careful using the numbers that are put out by either side during a war. Overclaiming is just a historical reality, and it's very

difficult, even for a force that wanted to stomp it out, to eliminate it entirely. But what I think is

entirely. But what I think is interesting and potentially useful here is the pattern. The chart you can see on screen here shows the number of vehicles claimed, destroyed, or damaged by the Ukrainian USF force grouping in June,

August, and October across three categories: tanks, APCs, ifs, ACVS, etc. and toad artillery. As you can see, even though the USF has been ramping up operations, claim losses in tanks and

toad artillery have been relatively static. For the APCs and IFS, the

static. For the APCs and IFS, the numbers did jump significantly in October as the Russians renewed a number of mechanized infantry attacks. But

generally speaking, a lot of the ramp up in the stuff the Ukrainians claim to be hitting isn't in these heavy equipment categories. It's in things like

categories. It's in things like motorbikes and buggies where the number went up more than four times between June and October. It's in wing drones.

So, the ISR systems, the lottery munitions, the oneway attack drones, that went up from 454 claimed in June to 1,517 claimed in October. And perhaps most

notably, it's in the Russian personnel category, jumping from 45,521 claimed killed or wounded in these drone attacks in June to 8,060 claimed killed

or wounded in October. expressed another

way. For every Russian soldier these Ukrainian drone operators claim to hit, they're now claiming more Russian drones, motorcycles, and buggies than they did back in June, but less artillery and fewer tanks. Part of that

may be a result of a change in Ukrainian target priorities, but it also might just reflect a change in the Russian composition at the front. This is more of a light infantry and drone force, and so we see more light infantry and drones

being destroyed. Interestingly, the

being destroyed. Interestingly, the ratios get even more extreme when you factor in what the Ukrainians claim to have just damaged or wounded in the case of personnel versus what they claim to have destroyed. According to the

have destroyed. According to the Ukrainian data, if you hit a wing drone, it's likely that you destroyed it. They

claim,450 destroyed and only 67 damaged. For

Russian personnel, the claim is about 1.4 dead in these drone attacks for every one wounded. Whereas, when you're talking about the less squishy stuff, armor, and especially toad artillery, the odds of that equipment surviving go

up significantly. For the APCs and if

up significantly. For the APCs and if damaged outnumbered destroyed roughly 3 to one and for toad artillery by far more than 10 to one. Again, keep in mind where these numbers are coming from, but

I think they're useful for at least two reasons. They give us one extra data

reasons. They give us one extra data point on what the Russian military at places like Brosk likely looks like and what parts of the force are absorbing the damage while also helping draw attention to some of the potential strengths and weaknesses of the

Ukrainian force defending. And on the plus side for the Ukrainians, commentators on both sides tend to accept the Ukrainian drone operators are incredibly dangerous. That those forces

incredibly dangerous. That those forces are continuing to expand and that while the Ukraine might now have less of advantage in drone operations overall than they previously did, especially at a tactical level, there are still some

areas of definite strength. If Russian

drone operators from groups like Rubicon are particularly notable in that anti-logistics role, an area of comparative Ukrainian advantage might be in the use of things like heavy bomber drones against Russian equipment or to

lay mines. The scale of the impact here

lay mines. The scale of the impact here can be difficult to assess because some of the more effective operators these heavy rotor drones are often more secretive, think LAR group, but their ability to destroy Russian equipment and

inhibit operations is widely noted and notably that comes through in apparent Russian targeting priorities as well. If

you compare the targets that Russia's Rubicon Group, so their elite drone formation, have claimed to hit relatively recently, you'll see them claiming comparatively fewer Ukrainian armored vehicles and comparatively more targets related to Ukraine's drone

operators or the drones themselves. I

think in one of the most recent video compilations posted, drones, both bombers and smaller Mavics, outnumbered vehicles by something like 3 to one.

Both the Russians and Ukrainians appear to agree that Ukrainian drone capabilities are an absolute lynch pin of their defense. They're a significant part of the reason that Russian operations have been so slow and so costly. And I think we're generally

costly. And I think we're generally seeing that reflected in Russian efforts to attempt to suppress those Ukrainian drone capabilities or at the very least push those operators further away from the front line. The Ukrainians are also

arguably ahead when it comes to designing and fielding interceptor drones effectively and in significant numbers. And we've also seen them mirror

numbers. And we've also seen them mirror the Russian use of larger oneway attack drones as tactical weapons. An example

here would be the Ukrainian FP2, which is normally used as a one-way attack drone against targets deep in the Russian rear, who we've also seen used against Russian military targets. Not

just buildings, but also things like air defense systems, again with the help of a connection to an operator and a different sensor package. I bring this up because at the risk of oversimplifying, there's an argument that historically the Ukrainians have

had a bit of a gap in their drone threat range. Closer to the flot, you have the

range. Closer to the flot, you have the very effective Ukrainian FPVs and bomber drones. Deep in Russia itself, we have

drones. Deep in Russia itself, we have plenty of pyrochnic displays that serve as evidence of the effectiveness of Ukrainian longrange one-way attack drones. But you could argue there was

drones. But you could argue there was less relative capability in very roughly the 30 to 300 km range bracket where you might be engaging things like ammunition depots, fuel stoages, operational

targets. And that's where potentially

targets. And that's where potentially some of these larger systems might have a bit of a role. Yes, they're larger, easier to intercept, and more expensive, but they give the Ukrainian drone for small reach and the ability to deliver

much larger warheads. A building that might not care if you hit it with 2 to 4 kg of high explosive is probably going to notice if you explosively renovate it with somewhere between 40 and 100. The

flip side to the Ukrainian drone forces is the very tired, very overstretched Ukrainian infantry. In a lot of places,

Ukrainian infantry. In a lot of places, as we've seen, the blue and yellow line can get very, very thin. And part of the reason why these Russian infiltration tactics can work where you continuously try and move up small groups of

infantry. A lot of them die, some of

infantry. A lot of them die, some of them make it through and accumulate is because there are gaps in the Ukrainian line for those infantry to sometimes filter through. As I've said before, you

filter through. As I've said before, you need to think of this less as a solid World War I style trench line and instead small dispersed infantry positions that might only be made up of a couple of blo. That gives the Russians

fewer Ukrainian infantry targets to go after and enables a comparatively smaller force to cover a wide frontage, but it does leave gaps. It can lead to positions intermingling. And in yet

positions intermingling. And in yet another iteration of what is basically a historical constant, it can mean the life of an infantryman at the front in Ukraine is bloody difficult. One

manifestation of this is that in at least some cases, the ratio between drone operators and supporting arms and the number of dismounted infantry that might be carrying out a particular combat task has shifted more and more in

favor of those support elements. If back

in 2022, when the infantry firmly outnumbered the drone operators and you might see a platoon of dismounts carrying out a task supported by one or two quadrotors, now you might read reports of a handful of infantry

preparing to assault an enemy position supported by a much larger number of drone operators. The infantryman is

drone operators. The infantryman is still necessary in order to hold or take a position, but there are strong imperatives on parts of the Ukrainian force to substitute more drone power for

manpower wherever possible. That isn't

uniform practice, but it is something I think anecdotally we've seen more and more. What's probably helping to push

more. What's probably helping to push the Ukrainians in that direction, isn't just that drones are very effective, which they are, especially when combined with other assets like artillery. It's

that personnel inflows and outflows are inconsistent across different parts of the force. With the increased Russian

the force. With the increased Russian emphasis on targeting Ukrainian supply lines and support elements rather than the frontline infantry, coupled with the fact there are fewer Ukrainian infantry around, some reports suggest we have started to see the balance of Ukrainian

casualties shift away from those frontline infantry elements. But for a lot of this war, a disproportionate share of casualties on both sides have been borne by the poor, bloody infantry.

On a perhaps not entirely unrelated note, it turns out that when you have an extremely dangerous job that might also involve being stuck at the zero line for days, weeks, or months at a time without rotation, that tends to become the kind

of thing that people very much don't want to do. Meaning the infantry might be more likely to struggle to recruit and retain personnel compared to other elements and be comparatively much more reliant on the volunttold rather than

the volunteered. A lot of combat

the volunteered. A lot of combat formations, especially on the Ukrainian side, struggle to maintain their infantry strength. Meanwhile, when the

infantry strength. Meanwhile, when the drone operators of Ukraine's unmanned systems forces advertised they had 15,000 new positions opening, their claim is that more than 600 civilians volunteered to join on the first day, as

well as nearly 800 personnel that were already in the Ukrainian military applying for a transfer. Now, that's

just one day, one claimed example, but it is, I think, potentially indicative of a wider pattern. Some elements of the Ukrainian defensive formula, the drones, the decentralized fires are becoming more capable and more numerous as time

goes on. And you see that reflected in

goes on. And you see that reflected in the Russian casualty figures. But

without solving that underlying infantry manpower issue, it's hard for the Ukrainians to stabilize the front. And

it leaves the force constantly locked in a kind of firefighting mode. There

aren't always enough reserves available.

So different units get switched to different points along the front to deal with locations where those Russian infiltration tactics have started to create a local issue. But if those reserves are committed somewhere, say Povsk, they might not be available to

deal with an issue elsewhere. And that

I'd suggest is part of what makes the impact of a battle like Pakovsk so difficult to assess. We can pretty easily generate estimates as to what it may have cost Russia in terms of casualties, time, and military equipment

going after that objective. What's much

harder to obsess is what may have changed at different points along the front if the Russian and Ukrainian resources committed there had been available elsewhere instead. And so

maybe it's unsurprising that if you look for a front that represents a kind of contra example to Prosovk where the situation has been improving for the Ukrainians rather than deteriorating, it's probably going to be the one where those Russian bite and hold infantry

infiltration attacks can't really pay off because there's no nearby Ukrainian lines to infiltrate and it's a bloody long way to swim. This is Crimea. And

while it might be a secondary front compared to some of the areas that Russia is really pushing, it's also arguably an illustration of the way the value of a place's geography can change over time and where the Ukrainians appear to have found a way to inflict

often asymmetric damage. If you go back to early 2022, Crimea's geography was very advantageous for the Russians. It

gave Russia access to a location with a lot of pre-built military infrastructure, a lot of stockpiled supplies, and a jumping off point for one of the most successful axes of their invasion. if Russia hadn't had access to

invasion. if Russia hadn't had access to Crimea, for example, it's hard to imagine them ever making it to Hersan, let alone threatening Odessa. But even

though Russia subsequently took significant chunks out of Zaparisia and Hersan, it hasn't been all sunshine and rainbows for Crimea. Initially, it

benefited from multiple layers of defense. There were a lot of aircraft

defense. There were a lot of aircraft based there. The Russian Black Sea fleet

based there. The Russian Black Sea fleet projected power from there, and the Russians seized a number of platforms in the Black Sea and turned them into early warning and air defense installations.

Over time though, a lot of those assets were pushed back, destroyed or seized by the Ukrainians. The Russian Black Sea

the Ukrainians. The Russian Black Sea fleet was essentially pushed away from Crimea. A lot of the air assets were

Crimea. A lot of the air assets were moved and the oil and gas platforms seized or destroyed. And as Ukrainian drone and missile technology has improved, Crimea and its supply lines have steadily become more vulnerable.

Rail transportation on that northern Zaparisia route has become a bit of a favorite for Ukrainian partisans who have constantly sabotaged railway infrastructure or derailed entire

locomotives as in this case or this case or this case. You probably get the idea.

As the range of Ukrainian drones is increased, they become a part of this story as well. Because while an individual drone might not carry enough payload to do any significant damage to railway tracks, if you can find a BYO

chemical energy solution like a Russian fuel train, you can potentially get results. That doesn't mean Ukraine has

results. That doesn't mean Ukraine has been able to cut off these supply routes by any stretch, but it does give them a long artery that they've been able to continuously nick away at. Meanwhile,

Crimea itself has become a constant target for drone and missile attack.

Ironically, often targeting the air defense system stationed there. That

includes not just longrange oneway attack drones and loading munitions, but also Ukrainian naval drones sailing right up to Crimea and then being used as launch platforms for sometimes fiber optic guided FPVs and bomber drones.

Part of the challenge here for Russia is that because of the Black Sea, Ukraine can attack in this case from multiple directions. And compared to other parts

directions. And compared to other parts of the front where Ukrainian drones might have to first fly over a relatively densely packed Russian front which might have sensors, radar and short-range air defense systems first.

In the case of Crimea, Ukraine can often go around the frontline segment to attack the valuable S300s, S400s, and their radar systems directly. But there

are enough valuable operational and strategically significant targets in Crimea that the Russians likely feel obliged to continue providing with air defense anyway. And that dynamic where

defense anyway. And that dynamic where Russia is basically obliged to continue feeding valuable equipment into the grinder for Ukraine to poke away at is the kind of dynamic where the Ukrainians might be able to run up the numbers. As

a very very rough estimate, if you look at 2025 as a whole, we've seen a video of roughly one Ukrainian strike against Russian air defense systems or radars in Crimea every 4 to 5 days. Of those, only

a small minority, maybe one or two per month, make it into the visually confirmed loss data, usually because of the absence of aftermath footage.

Because unlike strikes close to the front line where you often combine an FPV or a load of ammunition with an ISR drone watching the engagement, a lot of these strikes are being conducted without a spotter. They said the uncertainty interval for how many

Russian systems are actually being lost here is really wide even by the standards of this war. But given the relatively low cost of these Ukrainian attacks, which overwhelmingly rely on lowcost unmanned systems and one-way

attack drones, that probably still represents a significant economy of effort at a time where Russia probably wants as many air defense systems as it can for home defense. Go back to 2022, and I doubt Russian technical protecting

the Kremlin was on anyone's bingo card.

Any stretch or degradation in Russia's groundbased air defense systems has the potential to be extra relevant if Ukraine succeeds in continuing to mature their long-range missile capabilities, as we have some evidence they might be.

Ukraine specialty still very much seems to be swarms of relatively lowc cost one-way attack drones, but missiles like Long Neptune or various Western systems represent a much higher complexity target for air defense systems. They're

also potentially much more destructive, and in some cases, we've seen Ukraine use them against air defense systems themselves. The images on the right

themselves. The images on the right there, for example, show the apparent aftermath of one recent Ukrainian strike of that kind. I bring all this up to illustrate one of those points I raised right at the start. Both Russia and Ukraine have multiple things that need

to come together in order to make their potential theories of victory, if you like, work. In some of those areas, like

like, work. In some of those areas, like long-range strike or the ability to inflict damage on the Russian economy, Ukraine's capabilities have been growing visibly over time. But those strengths are being weighed against two very

important areas of vulnerability. the

ability to keep the front at least acceptably stable in the face of constant Russian offensive pressure and the diplomatic and information struggle where Ukraine faces to paraphrase President Zilinski immense pressure and

an impossible choice. Now, while we could go around and keep looking at different parts of the front, Kubansk etc. I think it's worth zooming out for a bit of a bigger picture look at what we might take away from Russia's autumn

campaign and what we might expect going into the coming winter. On the one hand, I think the fighting demonstrates that no one has yet come up with a good way to attack on the modern droneinfested and transparent battlefield. Many past

Ukrainian offensive successes have relied on the element of surprise, but it's kind of hard to guarantee that your opponent will pull the military equivalent of always obligingly turn around when you point and say, "Look that way." While Russia's evolving

that way." While Russia's evolving infiltrationbased approach clearly is a solution, but given the speed and costs involved, probably not one that many militaries would rush to want to replicate. And I think it's far from

replicate. And I think it's far from clear that the Russian military or the Russian economy has enough in the tank to make it to its stated territorial goals, one assault ladder at a time. On

the flip side, the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian society is clearly under immense pressure. We'll go into these

immense pressure. We'll go into these issues in more depth in the future, but suffice to say, the Ukrainian military is struggling against a shortage of infantry, issues with mobilization, awareness

to a supply situation where the US is no longer a major military backer. Domestic

industry has tried to pick up the slack.

According to Zilinsky, 40% of the weapons being used by the Ukrainians at the front are now made in Ukraine. But

leaving aside the potential accuracy or not of that figure for a moment, there are still multiple critical capabilities for which Ukraine is almost entirely reliant on allied support. In the first half of this year in particular, Europe

stepped up in a big way. But fully

replacing the United States in any military scenario is never going to be a small ask. And Ukraine is now facing a

small ask. And Ukraine is now facing a surge in diplomatic pressure right off the back of a domestic corruption scandal that's already brought down two ministers. On one hand, in some

ministers. On one hand, in some respects, that's to be expected. Like

many posts Soviet states, corruption is one of Ukraine's more dubious inheritances. As tracked by Transparency

inheritances. As tracked by Transparency International, the country has been improving. In 2012, by their measure,

improving. In 2012, by their measure, Ukraine was more corrupt than Russia.

But after the revolution in 2014, the two nations started to diverge. As you

can see on screen, the situation in Ukraine improved, peaking in 2024, while Russia's already dismal score dropped considerably over the course of the war.

But despite the improvements, corruption is still very much a blight on the country. And while it might be a good

country. And while it might be a good sign that some of the ministers involved have already faced consequences, strategically the timing and the optics of this have potentially worked in Russia's favor. At the same time,

Russia's favor. At the same time, Russia's position is clearly weaker than they try to maintain. The war economy is clearly being squeezed. Each exercise in cankicking becomes more expensive and disruptive than the last one. In many

units, quality appears to be down, desertion rates up, and while Russia has significantly evolved tactically, they've still struggled to find an approach that offers a choice of operational forward gears beyond the

likes of glacial or slow. Whether those

Russian challenges become critical or not, though, is clearly highly contingent. Ukraine is dealing with a

contingent. Ukraine is dealing with a stretch front line and facing a cold winter at home and uncertain support abroad. What matters now are clearly

abroad. What matters now are clearly things like the determination of the Ukrainian military, decisions made in foreign capitals, and some of that familiar harsh arithmetic of war, losses, replacements, and available

reserves. We'll try and put some data

reserves. We'll try and put some data around all of those in future videos.

But for now, I imagine a lot of Ukrainians will be nervously watching the diplomatic process play out as the military prepares for the challenge of another year of winter fighting. And

with that, let's do a channel update to close out. Firstly, on the channel

close out. Firstly, on the channel itself, thank you for your patience.

When I got sick last week, I hadn't originally intended to take an entire week off, but in the end, I'm kind of glad I did. My voice was pretty shot. I

wasn't doing my best work, and my hope is that by taking that week off, what we might finally see is some stabilization in the schedule. Beyond just getting this video done, I've also made a significant start on several others, including a number that have been

selected by the patrons. And so, my hope now is that instead of constantly chasing the Sunday deadline, I'll instead be a bit ahead of it, and if something ever comes up, I'll have something to release in the interim. So

again, thank you for your patience over the last week or two, but I hope it's going to lead to better content and a more reliable release schedule in the end. As far as the episode itself goes,

end. As far as the episode itself goes, remember a lot of it was put together last week before the news of the 28oint plan came out. In the end, rather than pivoting to too much discussion around it, I decided to stay focused on the

more battlefieldcentric elements. And if

it's still relevant in a week or two, I'll bake it into a future Ukraine update. I'd also include a bit of a

update. I'd also include a bit of a warning or asterisk that comes with the battlefield update like this one.

Basically highlighting one of the dichotoies of the battlefield in Ukraine. On one hand, even though the

Ukraine. On one hand, even though the pace of Russia's advance has changed over time, it's been relatively quicker more recently. For example, overall the

more recently. For example, overall the main constant for most this war has been just how slowly the battle lines change.

The flip side, of course, is that some of the factors keeping that battle line slow are very fast moving. Technical and

tactical adaptation, aid decisions, even the weather. And we're very much at a

the weather. And we're very much at a point in this war where the stability of the stability shouldn't be taken for granted. The wrong decisions or enough

granted. The wrong decisions or enough ignored issues on either side could either burn out the offensive momentum or alternatively destabilize Ukraine's defense. Both sides are facing pressure

defense. Both sides are facing pressure and threats in different ways. And for

Ukraine, battlefield conditions are extremely difficult. Even as their

extremely difficult. Even as their longrange strike campaign grows into its own, there are some very real risks in play for both sides and a lot of uncertainty as we head into the winter.

That said, we'll probably try and unpack some of the relevant factors there in December. But until then, let me just

December. But until then, let me just thank you again for your support, your engagement, and your patience. And with

any luck, I'll see you all again next week.