The 7 Most Powerful Moats For AI Startups
By Y Combinator
Summary
## Key takeaways - **Speed is the initial moat for AI startups**: In the early stages of an AI startup, speed is the primary and often only moat. Larger companies have more bureaucracy, making it difficult for them to ship products as quickly as nimble startups. (06:20) - **Process power: The hidden moat in complex systems**: Process power, or the moat derived from building a complex, hard-to-replicate business, is evident in AI agents honed over years for real-world conditions, like those used by banks for KYC or loan origination, which are far beyond simple hackathon demos. (10:18) - **Cornered resources: Data and deep customer integration**: Cornered resources can be unique data or deep integration into customer workflows. Startups that embed themselves with clients, understanding and translating their specific, often tedious, processes into tailored AI solutions, create a defensible moat. (16:40) - **Switching costs evolve with AI**: While traditional switching costs involved data migration from systems like Oracle or Salesforce, AI introduces new switching costs through deep customizations and lengthy onboarding processes, making it difficult for enterprises to switch providers. (19:31) - **Counterpositioning: Disrupting incumbents by cannibalizing their business**: Counterpositioning involves creating a moat by doing something an incumbent cannot easily copy without harming their existing business. This is seen when new AI agents automate work that incumbents charge for per seat, potentially reducing their own revenue. (24:54) - **Network effects in AI manifest as data flywheel**: In AI, network effects are driven by data; more user data leads to better custom models, which in turn create a superior product, attracting more users. This flywheel effect, seen in products like Cursor's autocomplete, strengthens the moat over time. (37:38)
Topics Covered
- AI Startups Face Infinite Competition Without Moats
- Solving Real Problems is the First Step to Building a Billion-Dollar AI Business
- Switching Costs: Why Customers Are Trapped in Your Solution
- OpenAI's Brand Moat vs. Google's User Base
- AI Moats: Data is the New Network Effect
Full Transcript
This idea of moes is so pervasive and so
important.
It is interesting how moes have just
become much more discussed by aspiring
startup founders now than they were pre-
AI.
What is going to prevent you from being
basically subject to infinite
competition?
Like a mode is inherently a defensive
thing and you have to have something to
defend otherwise like
if you got nothing to defend, don't
worry about your mode.
[Music]
Welcome back to another episode of the
Light Cone. Today we're going to talk
about Moes. So, in your head you might
be thinking about barbarians storming
your gate. You've got this little
startup and you've got every other
company out there who wants to come and
eat your lunch. Uh, and you know, right
outside your castle is a moat that keeps
them away. Jared, when you were going to
college campuses, this isn't sort of
this trivial thing that people are
thinking about. It's actually uh
something that keeps them from starting
companies right now.
Yeah, this is a question that we got
from a lot of very smart college
students on on our on our our recent
scholarships. And basically, their
question is like they don't see how
these new AI agent companies like a lot
of the ones that we've talked about on
on this podcast could have moes. um it
plays into this meme of like the chat
GBT rapper that like all of these
companies could be easily cloned and so
they can see how you could build a
business that makes some amount of
revenue, but they don't really see how
you can build a long enduring business.
And so I think it's actually not true. I
actually think these businesses do have
quite deep and interesting modes, but
they're not totally obvious what they
would be. So I think this is an
interesting topic for us to to explore.
At our recent AI startup school
backstage, I had this exchange with Sam
Alman that I thought was kind of funny.
You know, we spend a lot of time
thinking about, you know, make something
people want. Very simple maxims that are
sort of anti- business school. And yet
this idea of Moes is so pervasive and so
important. We sort of remarked how funny
it is that uh one of the more important
books to read these days is actually
business school fodder. um this book
called the seven powers. So today we
thought that we would actually go
through those seven powers. What are
they? What are some concrete examples
and ways that a startup founder who's
just starting out uh could or should be
thinking about these things from real
world examples that we've seen.
So Diana, can you tell us a bit about
this book?
This book was written by Hamilton Helmer
who taught at Stanford Economics School
and was published in 2016. And the book
title was the seven powers the
foundations of business strategies. And
a lot of the examples are more with the
era of uh internet companies from the
2000s. So a lot of the examples are like
Oracle Facebook
Netflix, which is a older generation. So
we want to do a bit of a reboot right
now how he applies now 2025 with AI.
I think it's a little bit confusing the
way he uses the terminology in the book.
It's called the seven powers, but it
would make a lot more sense if he just
called the thing the seven moes because
that's really what he's talking about.
He's really talking about seven
categories of moes that a business can
have. And I it's true that the examples
are out of date, but I think the
framework is actually pretty timeless.
Like it turns out there's just only so
many kinds of modes that a business can
have and they don't really change. And
so like even though the specific like
versions of these modes are different in
the AI agent world, like the categories
haven't changed. Thankfully, we live in
a world where there's markets and
there's free markets, where there's lots
and lots of competition. And these moes
in a lot of ways are the only way if
you're running a business, you can sort
of fight against all of the other people
who might want to do exactly what you're
doing. And um you know, famously Peter
Teal talks about uh competition is for
losers. And so the profound view there
is that given infinite competition, what
is going to prevent you from being
basically subject to infinite
competition and then as a result uh you
know your margins, how much you can
actually profit off of what you're
selling goes down to zero. And what that
means is like actually your business
will die and so you know having a moat
is uh relatively existential eventually.
You made a great point earlier, Gary
that like this is actually like you kind
of have to worry about this at the right
time of of a startup. Do you want to
talk about like how like early stage
founders should think about Moes?
I mean, this is sort of why we generally
tell people to go find a person with a
real problem and then go solve that
problem first. It's um what's funny
about the world uh that's a little
surprising is that you can go almost
anywhere and find some painoint, some
problem that could be solved with
software and especially with AI that
frankly just isn't being solved. And if
that and they're they're so numerous and
so severe that if you find that thing
and solve it, you literally can mint a
billion dollar or 10 billion or even
hundred or hundreds of billions of
dollars uh market cap business and it's
just lying in plain sight. That's really
the first thing that people should do.
Like you should just find a problem and
go solve it. And then along the way you
will probably as you work with customers
as as you build the product itself and
engineer it and figure out what data you
need for it and all of these things like
you will stumble upon these seven
powers.
Yeah. The moes come later like it would
be like pretty dumb for somebody to
decide not to work on a startup idea
because they can't see what the
long-term modes of that idea could be.
Right. It is interesting how moes have
just become um much more discussed by
aspiring startup founders now than they
were pre- AI. Seems like the main reason
for that presumably is just that big the
original chat GBT rapper meme and that
the the moat that most people are
worried about is moat against the big
model companies and how like are you not
going to get crushed by one of the big
labs when they decide the product you're
working on is really valuable and they
want to own it too. And I think Varun uh
from Windsorf who we hosted some time
ago he said it himself the early stages
at the beginning the only model that
startups have is really just speed. Once
you pass that and build something that
people want then you figure out and go
deeper into these type of modes that
we're going to discuss.
I really like Verun's point that the
only moat is speed. That is not one of
the seven powers in the book, but I
think it probably should be.
I think it also comes with a lot of the
essays from PD because one of the
tenants really at the beginning is yes
your big company, let's say OpenAI at
this OpenAI is the new Google. It's like
sure OpenAI or Anthropic could build all
these features let's say like cloud code
and then compete directly let's say with
cursor or etc. And for a startup like
cursor to really win even in the
beginning is they had relentless
execution because a larger company like
a Google or Anthropic it they just have
a lot of uh more craft that they need to
do in order to ship a product. They just
have all these product managers all the
operations. It needs to go through a PRD
some spec dog and it takes mo a lot more
time to ship a feature as opposed to
cursor. the incredible story about
cursor. When we hosted Michael Truel to
come talk to the badge, he was sharing
how his product development cycle for
shipping features and sprint cycles were
one day
one day. So one day sprint
in the at the beginning during a 2023
2024 around era they would start the
every day would restart the clock and
try to ship things every day. I mean
that's like insane speed. Like there's
no big company that could ship something
at that speed
at most weeks, couple weeks and maybe
like larger companies. I don't know your
Google maybe like multiple months or
sometimes years. I mean they had Google
Bard or Gemini a long time ago that took
years to get out, right?
I think Kurser and Windsor are great
examples of when you should start
thinking about the modes because for the
first few years I don't think it really
matter that much. They just had to like
they proved out that hey like codegen is
going to be a really valuable
application of AI. The development
environment is going to be very very
important to own. they like got rapid
growth and then it's only when they're
at scale that you know like they have to
start thinking about how are we going to
defend against like clawed code or
codeex or all the other things coming in
and sort of like the mental model that's
really stuck with me is when we spoke to
Bob Mcgru a couple of weeks ago um and
how I think Jared you brought this up
actually was one way you could think
about it is that sort of all of these
startups are kind of forward deployed
engineering teams like for for the labs
maybe and so like early on actually
because this is all green field we don't
actually know what the valuable
verticals and products to build are. So
in a sense you don't you step one is
just figure out what that is and it
wasn't actually even two years ago it
wasn't actually clear it was codegen or
um the IDE once you figure that out and
you find and you sort of struggle then
you keep digging that's when you have to
probably assume at some point you're
going to get more competition because
people, are going, to, realize, oh, this, is
really valuable there's lots of money to
be made here and then you have to start
like defending like the treasure you
found. So, I mean, all the things that
we're about to cover aside from speed
are sort of 1 to a billion, 1 to 10
billion, 1 to a 100red billion, one to a
trillion dollar sort of problems and
then uh the real stupid thing that
people might do is watch this and look
for this as a reason to not even get to
one.
Yes. So that would be
they try to use it to like pick between
two different startup ideas because
they're like trying to forecast five
years in the future which one will have
a greater moat
which just isn't how it works. I mean
literally you shouldn't do that.
Like a moat is inherently a defensive
thing and you have to have something to
defend otherwise like
maybe you have nothing.
Yeah. Hey nothing to defend. Don't worry
about your moat.
Yeah. Otherwise it's just like a puddle
in a field.
Yeah. Exactly.
Let's assume that someone has found
something that's valuable that is worth
defending. Should we talk through what
some of the modes they they could think
about are?
Yeah. So process power again like the
terminology is kind of funky but like
basically it means you built something
that's like you built a very complicated
business with a lot of stuff that's just
hard for people to replicate just
because you like built all this stuff.
Um and so the example that he uses in
his book is like the Toyota assembly
line. And I think the AI version, the AI
agent version of this is just a really
complicated AI agent that's been like
finely honed over like multiple years to
work really well under real world
conditions. We've we've talked about a
bunch of these on this podcast like Jake
Heler with um Case Text is like the
original example. A couple other ones I
was thinking about from more recent
companies. We have like a couple
companies that sell AI agents to banks.
We have Greenlight who worked with Tom.
They do KYC for banks. And we have Casa
which like does loan origination for
banks. So it is essentially tells banks
like which loans they should give. And I
think these are interesting examples
because, for, all, of these, AI, agents, you
could build a version of green light or
CASA or case text like a like a demo
version in like a weekend hackathon. And
I think when college students are
thinking about these AI agents I think
what they have in their mind is like the
weekend hackathon version of the product
and they're like like I could build that
in a week. Like how could that be
defensible? And like the reason is like
the the version you build in a hackathon
isn't useful to anyone. It's like like
like like if Casca or or Greenlight fail
like the the banks will lose millions of
dollars. This is like missionritical
infrastructure. So it's it's more like a
self-driving car.
One way to look at it is way better
engineering
uh is actually that's like the most
profound form of process power. Like one
example might be Plaid which you know
the surface area of the number of uh
financial institutions that they have to
support is so giant it's you know
probably thou on the order of thousands
to tens of thousands of different
different websites different crawlers
and then all of the different you know
can you imagine like Plaid's CI/CD
structure and then you know this is pure
speculation but if I were uh Zach
running plaid like I you know know that
I would want to be using codegen tool
the latest codegen tools to be able to
uh you know basically add every new
financial institution on the planet
quicker than anyone else. Like that's
sort of a very profound form of process
power uh in the modern AI age.
I think this is probably the main form
of defensibility for the existing SAS
companies. Like if you look one
generation before the AI agent companies
like why is Stripe or Rippling or Gusto
defensible? I think it's mostly this
right. It's just like they've just built
a lot of software and it'd be really
expensive and hard to replicate all of
it and like you can't just copy it from
their landing page. Like there's like
like the backend logic is like super
deep.
There's, also, I, feel, like, kind, of a, shle
blindness aspect to this going on too
where like the the hackathon version of
any AI tool is like quicker than ever to
get to. But actually the last like 10%
of getting it to work reliably across
like tens of thousands of KYC requests
like per day is sort of like a
particular type of painstaking
drudgery work in a way that I think like
lots of engineers just not excited to
do. And then that is also kind of like
the teams at OpenAI are going to
experience this too, right? Like if
you're, if, you're, working, in, one, of the
big model labs and there's teams of
people trying to invent AGI, um it's
going to be hard to get jazzed about
nailing the like final 5% consistency on
your like KYC tool.
Yeah. And so I I think this is
especially true for like verticals like
KYC that are require specialized
knowledge to even know what to even to
know what the edge cases are. Like if if
we had to pick from the seven powers
like I think speed and this these are
probably like the two dominant ones that
come up the most often
and those are most related to execution
is where uh the hardcore builders win.
having really good product taste and
building the best product really matters
and I think it comes to a lot of the
point maybe the the misconception is I
think a lot of these products you can
probably build the 80% solution with 20%
of the effort but for these solutions
and products to work you need the 99%
accuracy one which then takes like 10
times or even sometimes 100 times the
amount of effort right it's sort of that
parto principle type of thing what about
uh the the other power for corner for
resources.
I think the classic view is they're just
coveted assets or things that uh you
know they're not arbitrageable. Um they
must be independently valuable and then
I sometimes they offer preferential
access with you know rates that are way
lower. So uh the classic example that
you know you could look at is you know
pharma companies have these patents that
are very hard to get. Um they have to
come up with them and then prove them
and get through regulatory approval. And
the sheer fact that they have a patent
plus you know uh getting through FDA
approval is something that can be very
durable and it's uh you know so powerful
that patents have a uh limited lifespan
because you know you don't want people
to have that forever. A more modern
example I think you know on the
regulatory side might be you know scale
AI is doing a ton of work with the DoD
um you know Palunteer as well. Uh, in
order to even get there, it's, you know
a painstaking process. You've got to
hire the right people. You've got to
spend a lot of time in DC and Langley or
wherever, you know, you're trying to
sell to. And, uh, you've got to
literally build um, uh, skiffs, like
these like sort of, you know, special
data uh, centers where, you know, it's
at great pain and expense. Um, you have
to get embedded with the government. But
then when you do, like, well, you've got
it. you know the corner resource in some
sense is even the brain space in people
who work in the government like you
right now if you're working with AI like
you've got to go through a palunteer or
a scale and that's like literally
written into their uh public documents
around like how they're thinking about
the nature of warfare and the nature of
uh you know everything that they want to
do having to do with AI moving forward.
So, you know, the corner resource
doesn't have to be a diamond mind. It
could be the diamond mind in your
customer's heads. Those examples are
sort of uh closer to like being way up
in the sky having this like insane
decacorn like worth hundreds of billions
of dollars sort of situation. But what's
relevant for startups that I think all
of us uh sort of see every day is sort
of what you were mentioning with uh this
forward deployed engineer you know FTE
forward deployed engineer model that uh
that is what a lot of startups that are
extremely successful today are literally
doing like they're going out and getting
a cornered resource in the form of real
data and real workflows um literally
sitting with a customer who normally
would never get access to good software
and then spotting Okay. Uh this is sort
of the tailored time in motion. You
know, first the uh you know a request
comes in by email. Then we take this and
we enrich it in this way. Uh sometimes
we have to have a call center call this
person like you know actually
understanding what um might be a very
boring process um and then translating
that into your own prompts, your own
evals, eventually your own uh data sets
to tune your own models. Like those are
all things that are incredibly valuable.
And then uh clearly there are examples
you know earlier uh we're saying like
character AI for instance um you know
took LLMs you know obviously built some
of the first LLMs then took many of them
and then fine-tuned them in a way so
that they could bring down the cost of
uh serving those models by 10x and so
you know that itself is also a form of a
cornered resource. the best cornered
resource to have is your own model that
can like do the specific work. Yeah.
Better right?
And for a while, people thought that
that was the only mode that you could
have in this space. If you didn't have
your own model, like you were totally
hosed. Turns out that's not true. Turns
out there's just one of the possible
modes.
Partly that is a threat people are
worried about in in the big picture. The
10,000 foot scary thing is if the labs
at some point decide to treat their
models as a cornered resource and they
restrict access. I guess the interesting
thing right now is like it may well be
true that the you know platonic ideal
perfect manifestation of an AI system
will require a lot of both you know
maybe uh pre-training post-training RHF
like just so many different things that
you have to throw at it to get it to
like chat GPT level but we're also so
early in the revolution that um you know
even if just context engineering gets
you 80 or 90% of the way there. That's
plenty. That's actually all people need
to do for like the first 2 years of
their startup almost always. You know
Cursor didn't start out by doing, you
know, full parameter fine-tunes of GPD5
which they probably have access to now.
Um, they started just by making
something people want. You earlier we
were saying like don't use these
frameworks to count yourself out
prematurely. And this is a very profound
version of that.
So the third power we're going to
discuss is switching costs. That is uh
the concept where you get a mode when
your customers
are kind of trapped because it becomes
very expensive for them to find a other
solution. Even if the other solution
might be like a little bit better, it's
just very painful for them to switch
financially or in terms of the
operations times or effort because they
just have so much of it in the current
solution. And examples that are given in
the book are um like databases like
Oracle. When you have all of your system
of record and all your data in Oracle
it becomes incredibly hard to migrate.
like database migration is something
that people don't do. Other example
given is a Salesforce and because once
you have all your customer records in
Salesforce you build all these workflows
the UI and it's just a lot to retrain a
lot of your sales team to use like a new
software you need to like migrate all
the data and then at that point for the
company to switch to a new CRM is
probably, going, to, take, I, don't know, lose
like a whole year of productivity or
something even if the new solution is a
little bit better. I think how AI
companies are building mode with this
has to do with a version of what Gary
mentioned with the forward deploy
engineer. We've given examples of this
with Happy Robot or Salient where they
start with specific workflows that are
very customized per company and they
work uh with large enterprises and part
of it is actually with the forward
deploy engineer they may have actually
very long pilot pilot periods which
might last like six months to a year but
if they succeed these convert into seven
figure contracts and the reason why
these pilots are so long is because
They're very much building custom
software for the specific operations in
these companies. And the examples for uh
Happy Robot, they got customers like DHL
where they went deep into integrating
into a lot of the workflows for how all
their logistic operations are done which
is very accustomed to the DHL operation
or the example for salient who's
building AI voice agent for the
financial industry. They integrate with
banks, and, a, lot, of the, banks, have, very
different workflows on how they do a lot
of the loan
consilation, how do you do the debt
recovery,
how they do a lot of the fraud
monitoring
and risk and compliance and it's all a
little bit different because all these
companies have built kind of internal
tools and the whole part of u being an
AI company that builds these workflows
they build custom workflows then that
work with them. But as a result, the
trade-off is you do have very long pilot
cycles, but the pot of gold is worth it
because you end up with this big
contract and once you're in, you're kind
of minted and the big enterprise is not
going to do another bake off because
it's gonna it's going to be a huge waste
of time for them to let's try the other
whatever cool AI voice agent company. At
that point, it's like we just want to
get the benefits. So that's how these AI
companies are winning. I think it's like
at once a moat and it's also uh in it's
interesting in the age of AI that uh
simultaneously you could how see how AI
brings down the cost of switching by a
lot and that's you know sort of another
lever that a startup could use like if
you can write um use codegen to
basically extract data out of old oified
systems or your competitors then you you
know there are things that might have
really relied on switching costs that
you could potentially bring it down to
zero.
Yeah, there's actually two different
flavors of switching costs, right?
There's the the old school ones from the
SAS era, all the system of records like
Salesforce, but also ATS's like like
Lever and Ashb where the switching cost
was the painfulness of migrating data
from one system to another. And I agree
with Gary. LLMs might significantly
reduce the switching cost because the
LMS can figure out how to like morph the
data from the old schema into the new
schema. You use brower like use browser
automation on both sides to like solve
issues where like people don't let you
export the data. But then there's this
new form of switching costs that I think
is pretty native to the AI era like
you're talking about to Tayiana which is
like this these these lengthy onboarding
processes that lead to like deep
customizations of the logic of the agent
not just the data that didn't really
exist in the SAS era. Like I guess you'd
like customize your like your Zenesk
implementation a little bit but like not
that much.
Yeah. I mean and then for AI companies
on the consumer side, I mean this is all
very nent, but like I think memory is
already becoming a bit of a switching
cost for me. Like it actually blew me
away that Claude was so behind on memory
and then you know uh my relationship
with Chetch I feel like has evolved very
significantly in the last year where I'm
like oh I actually just generally it
seems to know you know what I'm into and
what I care about. So you know that
switching cost I think over time will
only become greater and greater and so
personalization for consumer is actually
a huge piece of that.
What about counterpositioning the other
moat on the book?
The definition of counterpositioning is
doing something that is difficult for
the incumbent that you are competing
with to copy because it would
cannibalize their business. I think
there's a couple of ways that this plays
out. In every category, there is a
Darwinian competition between the
existing SAS incumbents building their
own AI agents and the new AI native
companies building AI agents on top of
the existing SAS companies. So like for
customer support, the existing SAS
incumbents like Zenesk and uh Intercom
and front are all building their own AI
agents. But then we have like a new wave
of companies that grew up in the last
couple years that are building AI agents
that interface with with those systems.
I, think, it's, like, I, don't know, this
could be a topic of a whole like Lite
Cone episode which like who will win in
in in each of these fights I think is
really interesting. Um
unstoppable force meets the movable
object.
One way where this is playing out in the
counterpositioning is that all almost
all these companies their pricing model
is they charge per seat i.e. per
employee. And this is I think a very big
Achilles heel that they have
strategically which is that if their AI
agents do a good job and actually work
those companies will need fewer
employees doing this work because
they're like the work will be automated
by AI agents and in a and in a
simplistic way that will just actually
reduce the more successful they are the
more they will reduce the revenue. My
guess is like some of them will be able
to navigate this like especially if
they're still founder controlled. I
think like intercom for example like the
I think the founder controlled versions
of these companies are smart enough to
recognize that this is existential and
they may be able to cannibalize
themselves. I think the ones that are
not, founder, controlled, I, don't, have a
lot of hope for it's super hard to
cannibalize your own revenue.
The alternative as we're seeing is so
much of the startups um pricing models
are around sort of like work delivered
or tasks completed. I think it's it's
exactly what you said, but it's also
that then switches the product towards
having to actually be able to complete
the work. And um something I actually
repeat at the last YC batch um at the
end as closing advice is that I wish the
founders in a batch could just somehow
go spend a month at some of the latest
stage companies. Um uh cuz the top thing
we hear from the founders running those
companies is how hard a time they're
having sort of resetting the engineering
culture in their org to actually embrace
AI to use the tools to want to do like
context engineering and prompt
engineering and and the the net result
of these teams not actually being able
to be AI native one of a better term uh
is that they just can't deliver the
products that work right and so like
they both don't want to switch from
Percy pricing because like that's what
they're used to um uh and in a world of
AI being able to do the work, there's
going to be less seats to sell to, but
they also just cannot deliver on
products that can do the work. And so
they they wouldn't that that pricing
model is not going to make any sense for
them either.
Yeah, it's it's like the process
engineering part. They're not good at
the process engineering part for this
new kind of engineering.
I mean something sort of uh emerging
that's very interesting in a bunch of YC
startups like uh Aoka for instance
they're doing customer support software
kind of like Service Titan but for um
HVAC. So literally like people who help
you with heating and uh air conditioning
and uh you know I think service titan
has something like 1% wallet share 1% of
the gross transaction value of like a
given HVAC company um which is very
small right I mean people don't spend
that much money on software because
these are relatively low margin service
businesses but the wild thing that Aoka
discovered is that you know they can
come in as software but then over time
they're actually getting a bigger and
bigger chunk of the wallet share because
they can get the HVAC people to pay them
uh actually for the customer support
piece which is not 1% of their spend but
four to 10% of their spend. So what you
may well find is that uh this new breed
of AI startup will actually have more
growth uh and uh higher wallet share.
So, you know, actually, we may well be
all uh undervaluing how powerful and how
big the vertical SAS uh AI companies
will actually be because you're not like
1% of wallet share. You can get to 10.
That's what we talked in that episode
where vertical AI SAS agents will be 10
times at least 10 times bigger than SAS
because it's really to your point Gary
tapping into a whole different part of
the spend of the companies is not the
wallet of software where you're kind of
at this point I suppose is a bit of a a
finite budget but is really new space
where with things that were not possible
and it was mostly workflows from from
people
and I you know I know that people are
like pretty sensitive about uh workforce
displacement but you know customer
support for an HVAC services company is
not a fun job and you can tell because
all of these customer support jobs
actually have like 50 80% annual
attrition rates. like they're just such
torturous, not fun jobs that uh the
companies themselves and the call
centers themselves spend almost all of
their time trying to vet and bring in
more people to work on these terrible
jobs. And so when you have better
software, what's sort of happening is
that instead of like people aren't
losing their jobs, these people are
quitting their jobs anyway because it's
terrible job. And then if anything uh
what Avoka has told me is that many of
the people who were in those customer
support uh you sort of roles uh now
they're actually having more fun jobs
because instead of like managing a whole
set of people who don't want to be there
uh they're actually managing AI agents
and then handling the interesting weird
cases. The coolest part of it is like
they actually can go in and sometimes
alter the prompts and sometimes you
actually have an imp direct impact on uh
both the experience of the customer but
then also their own day-to-day and that
immediately is like a 10 times more
interesting job like wrangling a bunch
of AI agents and making uh the support
process better and better over time.
Like that's you know as knowledge work
goes like way more interesting than
follow this script and read what the
computer says.
So Harj you you had a really interesting
point about a second form of
counterpositioning. this space has moved
so quickly that in every vertical um or
many verticals there's sort of early on
emerged one company that's seen as the
early winner in the space and often it's
actually, like, the, second, movers, at least
within the YC context we have seen over
and over again that like there's
advantage to being the second mover in a
space like stripe came after uh Brainree
and authorized.net then a bunch of
things and was able to like actually win
by just building a better product. Door
Dash came after Grubhub, Postmates
various other delivery services and
eventually went on to win. And so I
think it's interesting to sort of just
consider about if you're entering a
vertical where it's already feels
competitive or there are already there's
already seem to be like a early winner
in the space. How do you counter
position against them? One thing I think
is really interesting here is Legora
versus Harvey. Lagora is obviously uh
both in the legal AI space. Harvey was
the early winner. The counterpositioning
that I see from Lorraa is Harvey came in
early and maybe got early sales um but
focused a lot on fine-tuning and sort of
like their product differentiation when
over time it's seen that that was
probably not the right move. You wanted
to actually focus in on the application
layer and actually just sort of building
a better product and and Lora has
focused on that. That's what their
branding and positioning is and it seems
to be working really well for them as a
second mover into the space. A company
that I've worked more closely with, Giga
ML, enter the customer service space and
they're competing with Sierra and
Deacon, like really well-known customer
support companies and from having seen
their sales motion, how they've been
able to sign up some big customers.
They're I think their counterpositioning
is their product fundamentally just
works better out of the box and as a
result they can have a much faster sales
and onboarding process. So it's like
their counterpitching is if you want to
sort of get your customer support
working as quickly as possible um you
should go through like the Gig ML
onboarding process versus like the
decong and I think that's actually
worked quite well for them.
Yeah, Giga ML is an interesting example
of how to your point about like hybrid
displacement.
It's clear that an AI agent can do this
job not just as well as a human but
actually much better than a human. like
the Door Dashers that the Giga ML agents
are talking to, a lot of them don't
speak very good English. They speak all
kinds of languages. You can't hire a
customer support person who's fluent in
200 languages. Um but
but LMS are actually out of box.
Out of the box. Um and they're
infinitely patient if like there's a bad
connection or so that's pretty
interesting.
I think you have other example where to
your point of superhuman abilities is
where the AI version of the product
actually works. I think Hargie you had
the example of a Dualingo versus speak.
Dualingo is obviously the biggest
language learning app I think um most
consumers know. The emerging criticism
of it I would say is that um what it's
actually just sort of like a gaming app
versus a language learning app that like
the way the app works is orthogonal to
learning a true language. And then you
have speak um which is a uses LLM like
uses voice to actually like help you
practice and actually learn the
language. Um, and that
counterpositioning is working really
well for them, right? And sort of
speakers has got explosive growth and
it's not trying to compete with Dualingo
on the we're we've got like lots of
gamification and points and sort of like
a great game mechanic. It's competing on
hey, we're actually just a place you
should come if you want to learn the
language by speaking it. I think the
counterpositioning mode is very um sort
of close and overlaps with the branding
mode idea. I think in the book he talks
about you know like brand is it's
essentially a mode when you become so
well known that even if you have an
equivalent product um consumers will
still choose you um because the the
brand effects and I think the the
example uses like Coca-Cola in the AI
context I think it's probably harder to
apply brand as a moat directly to
startups it just takes time to acquire
brand um but you can certainly see its
effects like the thing that still stuns
me is open AI chat GBT has more
consumers is using it per day than
Google's Gemini. I think anyone who
understands the models and uses them um
daily would say that Gemini Pro 2.5 and
Gemini Flash 2.5 are like equivalent
models
and Google also had all the users like
basically everyone in the world is a
user of Google.
OpenAI had no users initially.
Google was already one of the biggest
consumer brands on the planet. It was
almost certainly the biggest consumer
brand on the internet and yet somebody
else came along and built the brand as
the consumer AI app and Google is like
playing catch-up.
If someone had try had told me in 2022
that that's how it would play out, I
would have been fairly incredulous.
It's also a perfect example of
counterpositioning. Again, I mean, this
is Google had a uh a business model that
required it to continue to support ads
and an organization that uh they
shipped. And so, you have the greatest
cash cow in the history of man. So, why
would you disrupt it um even at the cost
of setting back uh human access to
knowledge by a few years? Even if that's
like the core stated goal of Google
itself to organize the world's
information,
there's also the untold story of how uh
the origin story of Chachib how it came
to be which is really the original mode
for startups with speed. It shipped very
quickly in a matter of months with a
very small team of a couple engineers. I
mean, it required uh you know, Sam Alman
and YC Research and Greg Brockman to go
uh hire Ilia Suskgiver out of DeepMind
because he was there and you know he all
the people a lot of the people who went
on to help create OpenAI uh they came
from DeepMind like it was already in the
right place. It's just that that place
didn't nurture exactly the thing that
society really needed
for speed.
So there's that mode again speed number
one. Do you want to talk about network
economy Diana? Yeah, on the book a
network economy is described as uh where
the value of the product increases as
more users or customer get and use the
product and everyone deres more value as
a effect of more people using it and
examples that were given in the book are
uh Facebook where as you use it and your
friends use it is more fun for me to use
Facebook because all my friends are in
there as more users come in then is the
social network becomes more valuable.
And this was very much the era of uh the
internet where people talked about uh
network effects that came to be. And the
other example he gives is like visa the
visa network where the more merchants
are using Visa
the more value the consumer gets because
you're can swipe the Visa card in more
places. then that becomes the the moat
because it's harder to then acquire and
amass this number and large number of uh
users or merchants in order to to win.
So that becomes very defensible. In the
current era for AI, the shape of uh
network effects is different. It really
comes into the shape of data. I think a
lot of uh the data that a lot of AI
companies get access to becomes the mode
where the more data they get the custom
models they build become better and the
better models it becomes a better
product for users and there's lots of
examples of these and um besides like
the big foundation
lab companies where they probably use
some of the data I don't know I mean
they probably use some of the data from
the users they probably do
checkpt almost certainly like feeds a
lot of that back because you have a
certain reward function for right
each training run, right?
So all the history of every chat from
chat GBD 1 2 3 4 5 now goes fed into
GPD6 and then so on and so forth helps
create the the next model version. And
there's uh even smaller versions of
this. For example, cursor, they have
probably one of the best uh tap tap
autocomplete because one the the free
version of cursor they actually say it
when you sign up that they they will use
the data and they use that to train it
and the more users they get
I think it's like all the data like I
think it's like quite literally like
every mouse click and every keystroke
that you that you emit when you're using
cursor like is fed into a model which is
like kind of crazy
which then the more developers cursor
the better the product gets and then
they, compound, a, lot, of, the, a, lot, of the
wins with that. And the version where
this applies to AI startup is when they
go work with enterprises and large
companies they get access to private
data. I mentioned earlier salient or
happy robot when the employees of the
companies where they become customers as
they use their product they have a lot
of that private data that makes a lot of
the workflows better and the way they
improve that which is the second way of
having modes with networks is really
evals we we talked a lot about evals
being the key mode for AI startups is
evals is where you get a lot of the this
workflow work or didn't work and then
take that back and iterate and improve
your context engineering. And that is a
flywheel that you can only achieve when
you get more and more usage of your
product whether being in a consumer or a
or a AI vertical SAS agent. So now the
last mode in the book is uh scale
economies. Jared, do you want to tell us
about it?
Scale economies or economies of scale.
you've invested a lot of money to build
something that's really big and as a
result you have economies of scale and
you can offer the service cheaper than
anybody else. So like the the classic
example would be like UPS or FedEx or
the Amazon delivery network. They built
like massive like physical
infrastructure and as a result they have
like a lower cost per unit um compared
to a smaller competitor. Um I think the
way this has played out in the AI world
I don't think it's actually played out
that much at the application layer. It's
really played at at the model layer
right? Like training a state-of-the-art
LLM is very capital inensive. Only a few
companies can afford to do it. Once
you've done it, you can afford to like
let people do inference on that model
very inexpensively. This is why the
DeepC announcement was so um was so
earthshattering last year because it
seemed like it might be a lot cheaper
than people previously thought to train
a Frontier LLM which would greatly
diminish the power of this like
economies of scale mode that people
thought the the AI labs had.
The key thing about Deepseek was they
figure out and made public this new
unlock for models which is uh how to do
RL. They still built on top of one of
the large foundation models so it's
still expensive. the rail part is
cheaper, but you still need the very
expensive big foundation model. So
that's one of the things that the media
got wrong.
There's a separate question that people
talk about, which is like how will the
foundation model companies be defensible
against each other? And like this is
certainly one way, right? It's just like
it's it's very hard to be a new entrant
into that game now because of this
economies of scale. And we were we were
thinking earlier about like how this had
played out with startups and there's not
that many examples, but I think a couple
of good ones. Well, one one good one is
is a company of yours, EXA. Harge, do
you want to explain what what Exa does?
Yeah, Exa is essentially search for AI
agents. Um, it provides an API for
anyone building AI applications that
wants to search the web.
And the way I I think this is playing
out for Exa is in order to provide that
service, they need to crawl the web. Not
the whole web like Google does, but a
big chunk of it. And that's very
expensive to do. It requires like a
large like fixed capital uh investment.
But then once once you crawl a big chunk
of the web, you can reuse that same
crawl for for many different customers.
I think what's interesting about X the
parallel to the model companies is that
they they had invested in that like sort
of before agents had really taken off
like they were fairly early to this. I
think they were working on this actually
even prehat GBT launching. So they made
the investment early on took a bet same
way that the lab companies took a bet on
like transformers and um uh and scaling
laws.
Yeah. And there are two companies in
just the most recent batch, Channel 3
and Orange Slice, that are both doing
exod.ai like plays where they crawl a
big chunk of the web, have a big like
static crawl on their own servers, and
then have agents that run on top of
those of that crawl. So, I think we're
going to see more and more of this
especially as the web agents work
better.
You need to mainly focus on uh the first
moat that isn't even in the book, which
is speed. like you know if you're really
breaking your brain about like oh well
are we going to be a cornered resource
or not you're just thinking about it in
the wrong way like you should not start
there you should start with do I have a
specific person who has some sort of
pain point and it's pretty painful it's
not like a oh it'd be nice if I could do
this it's a oh I am not going to get
promoted this year maybe I will get
fired like this is so painful that I
don't want to go to work today Like
that's sort of the type of pain that
you're looking for. And if you can write
software or build things that actually
alleviate that pain, like existential
pain, like the business is going to go
out of business or oh my god, we could
totally take over everything next year.
Like that's sort of the feeling that you
want in your customer. Uh if you can
find things like that, go go Z, you
know, go find that and go zero to one on
that first. With that, see you guys next
time.
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