UGREEN NAS - ARE THEY SAFE?
By NASCompares
Summary
## Key takeaways - **UGREEN NAS: No Major Vulnerabilities Yet**: Despite being on the market for over a year, UGREEN NAS devices have not yet experienced any widespread security vulnerabilities, unlike some more established brands. However, their long-term security response remains untested. [00:05], [00:41] - **Extensive Chinese IP Connections Observed**: After setting up a UGREEN NAS with all its applications and leaving it for a week, a significant number of connections to Chinese IP addresses were observed, raising concerns for some users due to China's cybersecurity laws. [02:54], [06:44] - **DNS Abuse Risks: Ransomware & Man-in-the-Middle**: Malicious or compromised DNS lookups can be exploited to trick NAS devices into downloading malware, ransomware, or facilitate man-in-the-middle attacks by redirecting traffic or providing fake information. [09:34], [10:35] - **UGREEN DNS IPs Not Always Recognized**: Unlike some other NAS brands where DNS targets are easily identifiable, many of the IPs UGREEN NAS devices connect to are not found in extensive databases like UniFi's, requiring users to manually verify their safety. [16:41], [17:18] - **User-Driven Security is Key for UGREEN**: While UGREEN NAS devices are considered safe currently, users concerned about security will need to be more hands-on compared to other brands, actively monitoring logs and configuring security settings. [18:14], [19:41]
Topics Covered
- Why Chinese NAS devices raise unique security concerns.
- DNS lookups: A hidden attack vector for ransomware?
- Global DNS pings are common across all NAS brands.
- How can you truly secure your NAS from external threats?
- UGREEN's software must adapt for global security trust.
Full Transcript
Are UG green NAS devices safe? It's a
fair question. For the last year, I
think about 14 months, they have had NAS
solutions in the market. They've got
several of them. But I think now after
this amount of time with this many
solutions and a lot of people giving
them very very good credit online, I
think it's only fair that now we talk
about security. Notwithstanding the fact
that this brand hasn't been tested in
terms of a widespread security
vulnerability. What do I mean by that?
They are a brand for example unlike your
Qaps, your terror masters, um even hell
your Synologies out there that have been
tested with things like Solo Locker and
vulnerabilities that have been found
within Linux kernels. They seemingly
have not had a large incident yet
because ultimately it comes down to a
vulnerability being found within Linux
and a lot of the time if it's not
hard-coded credentials of course it can
come down to how the brand handles a
security incident as well. And we still
don't know that about this brand. But
despite that, we do have these systems.
We can have them set up. So, we can find
out what exactly this device talks to
when it's on. And that's what today's
video is about. I set this device up,
the D84300 plus. And again, this can
largely apply to any UG Green Naz, I
think, at least in terms of the software
level. We can't really work out too much
on hardware at this stage. And we set
the device up a little under a week ago.
I set it up with one drive inside the
four bays. I then set up with the latest
generation of their Ugos software and
then I installed every single one of the
applications. Now I installed every
single one of the applications barring a
few third-party ones because again a
vulnerability in the third party
software. Yes, you could point at that
being the brand themselves not going
through the software hardly enough, but
I think that would be slightly
disingenuous to the brand. And also for
now I wanted to focus on just the apps
that they say are theirs and therefore
they have involvement in. And then from
there I did nothing. I left the device
for a little under a week running. So
afterwards thanks to me putting it
through a unified gateway it allowed me
to see the IPs it was talking to and
that's what we did. So let's fast
forward to the results. So it's just shy
of a week later. the UG green has been
set up barely interacted with as you'll
see from the logs in a moment. You can
see the tabs at the top of the screen
and I'll also say that periodically
throughout the video I'm going to appear
here on screen but ultimately there's
going to be a lot of information on
screen. I think my face is just going to
take too much up. So I'm going to flick
back and forth throughout the course of
the video. Um, but right now if we go
into the logs of this system, you can
see here that although I've been logged
into a few times there, some of the
applications that we installed early
doors are on screen there. Overall, it
hasn't really been interacted with at
all since that 6th of August set update
there. And of course, we installed every
single one of those applications. Now,
we make our way into my UniFi system.
And probably the most alarming thing to
anyone that's really used a NAS system
straight away is going to be just how
many times we can see Chinese flags here
on screen. Indeed, for the 9,42
active logs for this system that's taken
place during its operation. There you
can see all manner of IPs going outwards
from the system there. So before we go
any further, we need to highlight a few
things. Number one, what is a DNS? A DNS
or domain naming service is kind of like
the yellow pages here in the UK or just
the address the phone book. It
ultimately means systems being able to
find directories via this recognized
identifier, this IP. Now, because we
installed so many applications when we
initialized the U green NAS, each one of
those presumably has its own DNS lookup
table. It's going to be looking up
things like API servers, metadata
scraping for multimedia applications
there. For cloud synchronization, it's
going to be pinging some of the known
DNS servers in the US and indeed outside
of the US for some of those integrated
APIs. If an app has AI integration
there, do not be surprised if they've
got their own update methodology along
with the system firmware, which in of
themselves are going to have their own
DNS targets as well. Containerized
applications more often than not have a
huge array of different DNS lookups
built into the you know the image that
you're downloading from the
repositories. Uh your SSL certificate
authentication their firmware updates
the app center the application update
all of these have their own list table
that they generally ping back and forth
from. So regardless of whether your NAS
has internet access or not it's not
going to stop the system continuing to
ping them. But what makes this arguably
a much more haphazard undertaking for
most users when they're looking at
tables like this is going to be that
this is a NAS made in China that's also
being sold in China. So they're having
to facilitate a lot of different
markets. Hence why we're seeing a lot of
different regional um IPs appearing in.
It can appear incredibly intimidating
there. Let's break down a little bit
into what we're seeing here. Now, we
could break down into these IPs and go
page after page, but I think a lot of us
would agree that that's a huge number of
pings coming from a system that's been
in operation for less than a week. Yes,
we have to balance that against the full
range of applications and services that
we are running on this system right now,
but still, nonetheless, that is a lot of
them. However, once you break them down,
this is actually the full list of IPs,
at least for the first two or three days
that I was able to correlate. And as you
can see, the majority of them are DNS
related. So, for example, well-known
DNS's, we've got some of the US-based
ones. We've got the Google and Cloudfare
there. And then it breaks down to some
Chinese-based DNS down. We will go into
the good and the bad of that, by the
way, later on in the video. And then
you've got things like NTP. Now, that is
uh a system time check. Again, you get
it with Windows and a lot of mobile
devices as well. And then finally got
things like UG Green's own cloud service
endpoint which is their kind of relay
system going back and forth for the
transmission of information. Generally
that is also being used for some of
those firmware updates. So although I
see it on here and I'm not too concerned
about it, I will say the fact that I
disabled uh remote access when setting
up the device for um uh me to set up
generally if I wanted to play with the
system on the go. I do find the fact
that although I disabled remote access,
I wish there was a way to disable remote
checks via that relay for things like
updates. That said, we can't be naive.
There is a huge number of Chinese
domains there being listed for the DNS
uh calls for each of the different apps
and services. Now, DNS in of itself is
not inherently unsafe. Indeed, this
doesn't restrict it just to China. But
why do people have such a beef with
Chinese IPs appearing on their system
when they're in operation? Well, a lot
of that is to do with government policy
in China with regards to cyber security
law. So, for example, 10 cent, uh, Badu,
stuff like that. They're legally
required to log queries. So if they're
logging those queries, a lot of users
are concerned about Chinese governments
having access to, you know, u details
with regards to your encryption, details
with regards to your login uh specifics,
login policies, um you know, the, you
know, the jurisdiction and access to
that data will change from region to
region. Uh likewise when we look at
these DNSs and we sort of span through
each of these pages one by one and you
do see the same sort of IPs going time
and time again we also have to
acknowledge that the safe access and the
bounce back from that DNS back into your
system is going to be heavily dependent
on the security of the DNS. And although
some of these the bigger players there
are traditionally a lot safer than some
of the small unknowns, we still I think
a lot of users are going to have issues
with the reliance on some of these apps
and services requiring or at least
arriving by default with um IP pings
over there in the east being so frequent
with the more apps that you install.
exploitation of this kind of system for
things like malware or you know command
line injection are pretty slim it has to
be said but not impossible but the same
could be said with any regional IP being
used so this isn't you know unique to
Chinese-based DNS IPs but then don't
overlook the fact that you know it could
apply to a French IP a German IP and of
course DNS spoofing is something to be
concerned with so do keep in mind
depending on the setup you are utilizing
For example, if you uni using a UniFi
gateway like this one, you can, for
example, just select that, go down, and
of course, you can do this with other
systems, but it's a great deal easier on
the UniFi setup to just go ahead and
block that IP at source. So, you can
make sure it can never connect with it.
Yes, it will almost certainly mean that
the connected service that it's
connected to may not function fully, but
for some of you, that may well be
enough. And again, remember if you've
completely severed your NAS on its own
separate VLAN, you've separated it
completely from the rest of internet
connected devices and therefore it has
no internet connected service at all.
Yes, it's still going to keep trying to
ping the IP, but it's not going to have
access to it or access to outside
services to do anything with it. Now, a
very quick interjection here. I'm adding
in post cuz I realized I should have
gone into more detail about DNS and how
it can be abused in order to harm your
system which let's be honest is a real
serious concern. Now when you are having
these DNS lookups which by the way again
are perfectly normal in most NAS
operation how they can be abused for
example is as follows. If you have a
malicious DNS listed or your system has
fake DNS information provided where it
looks like it's going to one thing but
it isn't, that can result in the system
being tricked into, for example,
downloading a firmware update that is
compromised, downloading an exploitative
application update, which can then
perhaps have a backd dooror that allows
people to inject code. Remember, the
majority of the time these days with the
NAS, they're not trying to extract your
data. It takes too much. you'd have to
be in a huge organization for them to be
able to do that and that takes time and
can be easily um caught while it's
happening. Whereas the injection of a
line of code can lead to something like
ransomware where your system can be
zipped up, the original data deleted and
you will be ransomed to get the pass key
back in order to unlock your data. It's
quite common, normally Bitcoin related,
but that's an example of how a bad DNS
or at least a covered or fake DNS
address can be exploited. The same thing
goes for something that's commonly known
as man-in-the-middle attacks where um a
malicious DNS uh can actually be used to
enable a user in the middle to capture
packets of data going in either
direction. Again, that can also be used
for injection. This can be limited
somewhat with the utilization of
something like HTTPS, which will secure
and encrypt the protocol, but it doesn't
completely rule it out. were still
remember what we mentioned earlier on
about the sheer number of DNS uh lookups
that were taking place over those
periods of time. Um well with malicious
DNS or a bulk of malicious DNS's working
together actually sensitive information
can be distributed via smaller packets
across multiple small so high frequency
small volume DNS lookups. Again, not the
most common occurrence, but not
impossible. And just another reason why
verifications of DNS's are pretty
important. There are lots of tools you
can find online, lots of free ones, too,
where you can look up the sanctity of a
DNS. Go for some of the trusted
platforms or at least look up a
particular DNS that you're concerned
about via multiple outlets online to
ensure that one isn't giving you
falsified information. But still,
nonetheless, I think it's important that
although we are talking about DNS
lookups being on the whole a fairly
common thing on your NAS that we should
at the very least take the trouble to uh
to go through where they can be
problematic and also how to verify their
identity. Likewise, as mentioned in
other videos, going into the control
panel and actually changing what can
access what assign your own domain or
going for a dynamic domain naming
service locally to kind of fuzzy things
up. Likewise, you can go into network
settings and security settings on any
NAS, not just UG green, and change a lot
of your security policies, limit the
number of attempts. There are lots of
things you can do and set up to restrict
firewall rules and access rights on your
system to significantly reduce the
attack vector there. Still, nonetheless,
when it comes to the security of a NAS,
I do think it is better and of course,
you know, gateway the NAS, but also
gatewaying the network gateway as well
because that indeed does even better if
the NAS software in question again not
applicable to just you green any NAS
software. If the user interface controls
that you have, you know, implemented do
not get carried down to the hardware
level kind of backend, you know,
straight onto the PCB and the
controllers and chips, it's better to
assign a lot of these controls. Very
early doors on the network gateway. Now,
I do also think it's worth highlighting
that this list of IPs we can see here on
the bottom is not, you know, limited to
just the likes of UG. For example,
here's Sony's Bstation system here. Here
the Synology B station is a relatively
new system. This new B+ model, a very
simplified device or you have very
limited access to control, very limited
access to um restricting who can access
what your security implementation there
and more. The range of controls for IP,
domain, DNS services and more is
incredibly restricted as this is a more
simplified NAS platform and I think this
is quite safe. But nonetheless, when we
go into my UniFi switch, and you can see
the times on the right hand side of the
screen, this is a system I've only had
up and running for, you know,
essentially, we can go back to the very
latest page. I rebooted this device at
9:06 on this new network. It's right now
10:18, so it's a little over an hour.
And in that time, we've already seen the
system access a myriad of uh American,
uh, German, we've seen Japanese, we've
seen Italian, we've seen France, I
believe, on here as well. Now again,
there's no Chinese flags on there, which
I know a lot of you are going to be
pleased to see, but I do think we have
to be at least moderately balanced when
it comes to DNS's and obviously the
rules in which these countries uh these
host DNS server uh bounces taking place
reside and the impact they have. But
having a sheer range of uh 9,000 over
the course of a little under a week when
we're using a BS station here that only
has three applications installed, the
file one, the photos one, and the Plex
one still managed to achieve over 350 in
an hour. Now, if this really is
something that concerns you, you can go
for NAS devices such as uh the HL8 from
45 Drives I've got set up here with its
base hardware. And as you can see, the
list of regions covered in this
particular devices DNS lookups and NTP
pool for time checks are pretty limited
in terms of their scope. For a Canadian
NAS device, it's not surprising uh that
repo.45 drives based in Canada would be
there, but they're predominantly US and
UK based. Again, that's 138 over that
time. Then again, we've got things like
this. This is a Terra Master NAS, the
new F4425.
And this one, as we can see, when we
delve into the history of this device,
this is another one that's only been on
for about an hour, we can see this one
was powered on at 9:27 there. So, less
than an hour indeed. And at boot, we can
see Chinese DNS is getting pinged there.
And this was for the initialization of
the device. Again, it's setting up for
the first time. So, that was first time
boot. And now the system is established
with no applications and services
outside of the base level. We can see
that now there are no Chinese DNS pings
there. Again, as I install more
applications, no doubt there's going to
be different apps and services built
into the app center that have um out of
UK IPs being pinged there for DNS
purposes. But unless you're prepared to
take the time and look into these
individual IPs or use like an AI LLM to
look them up for you, it really is going
to be slightly down to you, the end
user, to monitor on top of this. Bottom
line, do I think UG Green is safe? I do
think UG Green is safe at this time.
They really do. But at the same time, I
think it would be remiss for users that
are installing a device predominantly
created in a Chinese uh regional
environment that's been distributed
outside to not at the very least take
the time to go through their logs and
especially if you're going to use a
server, sorry, a network switch in the
middle that gives you the ability to
really break things down to find out
more. But keep in mind, as you may not
have seen on the screen throughout the
course of this, that a lot of these IPs,
they're not service listed. Even on
UniFi's pretty extensive database, for
example, when we were looking at the
Synology there, pretty much all of them
were easily listed. They were using
recognized publicly listed um DNS um uh
targets there. So, the UniFi system was
very quickly able to pick those up. And
that was something we saw again when we
were looking at the HLA. But coming back
to the UG Green, they just weren't part
of that database. So take the time to
look them up. And again, I recommend
using an AI LLM because you generally
find they find the short lists quite
quickly of a lot of those listed DNS's
to let you know when it is a DNS that's
being ped out. And often if something is
coming back to you, again with firmware
updates and more, letting you know about
it when they are coming from recognized
sources. Once again, if in doubt, block
the hell out of any DNS that you're not
comfortable with. Go into the system,
uninstall application services that you
aren't happy with. Have two-actor
authentication, something that's very,
very difficult to countermand and get
around on a remote access level because
you need a local client with a
constantly a regenerating passcode
there. On top of that, get into your
system. Adapt your security settings.
Make sure, for example, you would have
enhanced DOS protection in place for
when you've got traffic coming the other
way that may be being taken advantage of
DNS spoofing in order to garner
information about your system to try and
reverse engineer an access point.
Finally, the majority of NAS devices
these days integrate firewall control
inside. Remember I mentioned earlier on
about in the NAS um sorry, the network
monitoring software that you choose to
use. Again, be that your PF senses, your
OpenWT route, uh, OpenWRT routers there,
or if you're using a UniFi route or
switch in the middle, again, you can
block them, but make sure you go into
the firewall settings of your NAS. If
you want to be particularly diligent and
if you find, for example, an IP that you
are not happy with. So, example, that
one there, you go in, set up your
firewall, and block a create a rule
where that is not going to have that
level of access via that very specific
port. You can assign those IPs quite
easily. It is worth doing that if you
want to be particularly cautious.
Nothing about what I have seen today
makes me think that UG Greens NAS isn't
safe. I will say it's going to require
more hands-on for those that are
particularly concerned than some of the
other brands I've seen out there. But as
I've shown you with examples from other
NAS brands, it what we're seeing here is
not wholly unusual for a device designed
and you know originally created in
another country. What could UG Green do
to change this? I would say definitely
they should go into their software
services and change some of this DNS
lookup on some of those applications and
services to be better fit into the
regions they are distributing within.
Certainly on top of that, I do think
that their brand could stand to be a
little bit clearer about the ability to
change some of the DNS protocol in some
of these apps. Something you can do, by
the way, with some of the containerized
applications a great deal easily. But
it's unfortunately that line between
creating one-click installation of
applications and applications and
services where you get to tweak and
tinker them like you can with containers
to have things best suit your needs. But
again, I wish their log system just gave
me a little bit more in terms of being
able to block uh block individual IPs.
Thank you so much for watching. I'm
going to be frank. This is an incredibly
dull subject to discuss. It's very, very
important. But it's really, really
difficult to make videos like this.
Interesting. That's the realistic truth
of it. People that care about this
stuff, the people that are prepared to
put in the time and effort and figure
out what they should and shouldn't be
doing or what they should and should not
be concerned with takes time. much like
making a video like this, which
unfortunately is probably not going to
get a huge number of views, but I think
it's important enough that it's
something we could discuss perhaps with
other NAS brands to get a good
understanding of the status quo if we
install all of their base applications
there. If that's something you want to
see, let me know in the comments.
Lastly, if you found this video helpful
and if you're looking to get any of the
devices or some of the recommended
software that I talked about today, link
below will be links that help you get
hold of these, whether it is hardware or
in some cases software. Using those
links result in a small commission
coming to me and Eddie here at NAS
Compares. It's just us doing this and
allows us to keep doing what we do. And
as I say, a video like this isn't going
to be that popular and therefore every
little bit helps. Thank you so much for
watching and I'll see you next
Loading video analysis...